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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Five years after the launch of the BRIC-acronym Brazil, Russia, India and China started a process of 
political dialogue, eventually leading to an increasing number of political, diplomatic and expert 
meetings – including yearly summit meetings between their Heads of State – covering an increasingly 
wide range of policy issues. Since early 2011 the BRIC nations accepted South Africa as a new member, 
transforming ‘BRIC‘ into ’BRICS‘. Reflecting the major differences between the five countries, the 
intensification of the relations between the BRICS countries does not mean that they do systematically 
form a bloc. Nevertheless, the increasingly dense networks between the five countries are based on a 
common goal: that is to advance the G20 and other new multilateral settings as an international forum 
and to counter what they perceive as an undemocratic and unjust Western-dominated multilateral 
world. The BRICS phenomenon should therefore be seen as reflecting a general shift in the international 
balance of power with the centre of gravity moving from the Euro-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific area and 
from the North to the South. This also becomes clear in the increasing dialogue in several variations on 
the BRICS format such as IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) and BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and 
China). They all have in common that they reflect a growing tendency towards preference for non-
binding commitments, which is quite different than the EU’s views on ’effective multilateralism‘.  
How coherent are the BRICS countries? At the UN General Assembly, they cast identical votes in 56–63% 
of the resolutions voted upon, which also implies that on a considerable percentage of the resolutions 
voted upon, they do not vote as a bloc. Other variations of the BRICS format show higher scores with 
the highest in rank being the IBSA format. Nonetheless, a closer look at specific foreign policy issues 
demonstrates that engaging more with the IBSA countries is not self-evident, as they often consider 
respect for national sovereignty and non-intervention as more important than promotion of human 
rights and democracy. Important in this context is also the decline of the overall image of the EU in 
these countries, which indicates that it is (no more) seen as a positive normative power. When it comes 
to global financial, economic and environmental governance, the BRICS countries managed to 
effectively enhance the role of informal forums of governance, such as the G20, and to have an impact 
on these forums. On major issues in the G20 and in the climate change negotiations, although not 
acting as a bloc, they often emerge as initiators of the debate and manage to influence the outcomes. In 
addition to sharing some objectives, they manage to coordinate their action in order to set the agenda, 
shift the terms of the debate or block proposals.  
Strategic partnerships have been established or planned over the past decade with all the BRICS 
countries as well as with other third countries. However, this proved to be mainly a rhetorical upgrade 
of relations, as becomes clear from an assessment of the current state of the EU’s strategic partnerships 
in terms of institutionalization, perceived value of the relationship, security relations, and concrete 
progress and sticking points. The European Council of September 2010 called for an evaluation of the 
relations with the strategic partners, but ambiguity about the nature of these partnerships remains. 
Moreover, the EU has not been able to use these partnerships to substantially upgrade its relations with 
the BRICS countries or to prepare itself for the shifting balance of power to the South and to the Asian-
Pacific region.  
This study proposes four theoretical options to further develop the concept of strategic partnerships as 
a policy tool and to develop a new architecture for the EU’s strategic partnerships with the BRICS 
countries – centred around the concepts ‘fusing’, ‘focusing’, ‘diffusing’ and ‘diluting’. The last section 
includes policy recommendations for engaging more actively with the BRICS countries in bilateral and 
multilateral settings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are playing an increasingly significant 
role on the international arena both in terms of economic and political weight, the latter emanating 
from the spectacular growth of the former. This has the potential, and in some cases already the effect, 
to substantially change multilateral power balances in many international forums, such as in the UN, in 
climate change negotiations, or in the G8/G20.  The objective of this study is to assess the nature of the 
rise of the BRICS countries, to evaluate the EU’s strategic partnerships with these countries, and to look 
at the impact on the EU and the EU’s foreign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers. This 
study is divided in two main parts. The first part provides an assessment of the foreign policy dimension 
of the BRICS (lead partner: College of Europe / K.U.Leuven, except for section 1.4, which was written by 
FIIA). The second part analyses the impact of the emergence of the new global actors on the objectives 
of EU strategic partnerships (lead partner: FIIA).  
The first part of this study provides an assessment of the foreign policy dimension of the BRICS, of 
the nature of the BRICS phenomenon, and of the behaviour of the BRICS in international forums. Its first 
section prepares the ground for the remainder of this study: it provides an overview of the evolution of 
the ‘BRICs’, from an acronym launched in 2001 by Goldman Sachs to a reality which is reflected in the 
growing interaction between the four BRIC (since 2008) and five BRICS countries (since 2011). It points 
to the gradually increasing number of meetings (and widening scope of issues covered in these 
meetings) and provides some basic statistics, as well as an initial overview of the main similarities and 
differences between the five countries. Section 1.2 situates the BRICS within the context of a growing 
number of emerging regional powers and of a multitude of partially overlapping and complementary 
multilateral organisations and cooperation schemes in the Asian-Pacific area and the South in general – 
including variations on the BRICS theme (BRIC, RIC, IBSA, BASIC). It also points to the potential and 
actual implications of these increasingly active networks on the international position of the EU and on 
‘effective multilateralism’. The objective of Section 1.3 is to answer the questions related to the voting 
patterns of the BRICS in the UN. This section is based mainly on a quantitative methodology, including 
new statistical material on the voting cohesion of the BRICS in the UN General Assembly and its Main 
Committees. Section 1.4 assesses the impact of the BRICS on the decision-making processes of new 
international forums and particularly the G20, as well as the implications for the EU. It focuses on four 
issues which have been particularly visible on the BRICS countries’ G20 agenda: reform of the Bretton 
Woods institutions, cross-border capital flows, the international reserve currency system, and climate 
change. The last section provides a short analysis of recent data on the perception about the EU in the 
BRICS countries, which points to a general decline of the overall image of the EU. 
The second part analyses the EU’s strategic partnerships with the BRICS countries and the impact 
of the emergence of the new global actors on the objectives of EU’s strategic partnerships. Section 2.1 
analyses the origins and trajectories of the EU’s strategic partnerships with the individual BRICS 
countries, including a discussion of the various meanings attached to the elusive term ‘strategic 
partnership’. In what historical contexts did these partnerships emerge, have these partnerships 
continued to deepen and grow more substantive, or have they remained largely rhetorical paper tigers? 
This provides the setting for an evaluation in Section 2.2 of the current state of the EU’s strategic 
partnerships with the BRICS countries. It examines four areas of the relationships that are deemed as 
particularly crucial: institutionalisation of the relationship, the perceived value of partnership, security 
relations, as well as concrete progress and sticking points. Section 2.3 assesses the possible new 
architecture for the EU’s strategic partnerships with the BRICS. It ponders the weakness of the current 
partnerships and considers the different options available to the EU for further developing the concept 
of strategic partnerships. This is done by combining a deepening-widening and interests-values 
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continuum, leading to four potential alternatives for the EU to develop its concept of strategic 
partnerships (fusing, focusing, diffusing and diluting). Each alternative represents a way for the EU to 
deal with rising international influence of the BRICS and involves certain opportunity costs and trade-
offs especially in its relationship with its more established partners. While muddling through is likely to 
remain the default option, it is time for the EU to think more strategically about which of these options 
might be most appropriate to represent its interest and values as an international actor in the future. 
The last section of this study formulates final conclusions and policy recommendations for the EU, 
including recommendations for the High Representative, the European External Action Service and the 
European Parliament. 
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1. ASSESSMENT OF THE BRICS’ FOREIGN POLICY DIMENSION  
1.1 FROM BRICs TO BRICS: ORIGIN AND TRAJECTORY 
In 2001, the chief economist of Goldman Sachs launched the acronym ‘BRIC’ in order to focus attention 
on the major potential of the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Goldman Sachs developed 
long-term projections, which were quite daunting for the European countries. The Chinese economy 
was expected to surpass the German economy in merely a couple of years time and the other BRIC 
countries would manage over the longer term to surpass the size of the economies of all large EU 
member states. The Goldman Sachs publication also contained a political message: it warned that world 
policymaking forums had to be re-organized in order to incorporate BRIC representatives.1 
Five years after the launch of the BRIC-acronym, Brazil, Russia, India and China effectively started 
a process of political dialogue.2 In 2006 their ministers of foreign affairs met for the first time in the 
BRIC format within the context of the UN General Assembly meeting, followed by other ministerial 
meetings on the margins of UN and G20 meetings. The BRIC format was further upgraded from mid-
2008 onwards with stand-alone meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs, the ministers of finance, the 
ministers of agriculture, the ministers of health and ultimately also the heads of state or government of 
the four countries – with a summit meeting being organized in Russia in 2009, Brazil in 2010, China in 
2011 and one scheduled for 2012 in India. Less visible, but at least as significant, is that the meetings on 
a political level are complemented by an increasing number of diplomatic meetings on lower levels, as 
well as meetings of civil servants and experts of specialised ministries and agencies that cover an 
increasingly wide scope of issues – ranging from high representatives for security issues and anti-
terrorist units to competition authorities and governors of central banks. This gradually more intensive 
network is further strengthened through the increasing number of bilateral (and sometimes also 
trilateral) meetings, organized on the margins of BRICS meetings and during bilateral visits of 
politicians, civil servants and experts from these countries. 
The ‘Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders’3, adopted during the first summit meeting in 
Yekaterinburg in 2009, points to the two main goals and tenets of this new political club, which 
remain valid. Firstly, it emphasised the ‘central role played by the G20 Summits in dealing with the 
financial crisis’. This reflected the success of the BRICs in advancing the G20 as an international forum to 
tackle the financial crisis and to foster policy coordination and political dialogue, and this to the 
detriment of Western-dominated forums in which they are excluded (such as the G7) or only have a 
marginal position (see Section 1.4). They also found good reasons for their position as their economic 
growth was not only stronger than predicted by Goldman Sachs, but had even led the global recovery 
after the 2008–2009 financial crisis.4 This highlighted that they were not only a threat or challenge for 
the Europeans, but also an essential part of the solution to the world’s economic problems. 
Secondly, moving beyond the economic agenda, the Joint Statement underlined their ‘support for a 
more democratic and just multi-polar world order based on the rule of international law, equality, 
mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all states’. This 
reflected their common willingness to counter a unipolar world in which the United States dominates as 
well as an ‘unjust’ Western-dominated multilateral world in which not all emerging powers have the 
same status as their European counterparts (cf. the UK and France in the UN Security Council); in which 
                                                               
1 O’Neill, 2001; Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003. 
2 See also Keukeleire and Bruyninckx, 2011. 
3 President of Russia – Official Web Portal, 2009b. 
4 Yamakawa et al., 2009. 
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respect for their positions and interests is not guaranteed; and in which they have no guaranteed 
involvement in collective decision-making. These concerns, as well as their opposition to the 
unilateralism of the West were also evident in the emphasis of the Joint Statement on ‘their strong 
commitment to multilateral diplomacy with the United Nations playing the central role in dealing with 
global challenges and threats’ and with the UN needing a comprehensive reform, including a greater 
role for India and Brazil. The Joint Statement also situated the BRIC framework within a broader 
perspective as their dialogue and cooperation was presented as conducive ‘of building a harmonious 
world of lasting peace and common prosperity’ as well as ‘to serving common interests of emerging 
market economies and developing countries’ – with the latter being seen as mirroring their 
international legitimacy.  
The claim that they were serving the common interests of emerging market economies and developing 
countries was further strengthened when the four BRIC countries in December 2010 decided to 
admit South Africa into their group, which early 2011 was transformed from ‘BRIC’ into ‘BRICS’. In 
April 2011, the South African President Zuma participated as a full member in the third summit 
meeting, joining the Chinese President Hu Jintao, the Russian President Medvedev, Indian Prime 
Minister Singh and the new Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. In view of its rather small economy and 
population, it would seem that South Africa does not fit in the group. But its close involvement in the 
Climate Summit in Copenhagen and its growing regional and international political weight provided 
South Africa an entrance ticket to this exclusive club. With the BRICS now also including an African 
country, the BRICS format can claim to not only represent a major part of the world population and of 
the world’s leading emerging economies, but now also all the continents. 
An exceptional situation occurred in 2011 when not only China and Russia, but also Brazil, India and 
South Africa as non-permanent members were part of the UN Security Council, which provided a 
further impetus for attempts to strengthen cooperation (see also Section 1.3). This was also mentioned 
after the 2011 BRICS summit meeting5: 
We underscore that the current presence of all five BRICS countries in the Security Council during the year of 
2011 is a valuable opportunity to work closely together on issues of peace and security, to strengthen 
multilateral approaches and to facilitate future coordination on issues under UN Security Council 
consideration.  
It remains unclear, however, what the extent of the meetings among BRICS countries’ officials exactly is, 
given the fact that barely any formal statements are released after these meetings. Nevertheless, the 
launch of the BRICS Action Plan in April 2011 during the third summit between the heads of state and 
government suggests a formalisation and upgrade of their relations. 
The development and strengthening of the BRICS format in the last couple of years confirms what has 
been emphasized in one of the first studies on the potential of the BRICS,6 that they have several 
features in common which distinguish them from other (emerging) powers and which bring them 
closer to each other. Firstly, they possess a range of economic, military and political power resources 
and some capacity to contribute to the production of regional or global order. Secondly, they share the 
belief that they are entitled to gain a more influential role in world affairs. And thirdly, they are outside 
or on the margin of the US-led set of international and multilateral structures and are not closely 
integrated in an alliance system with the US. It is this combination of factors, which explains the 
eagerness of the BRICS ‘to strengthen their mutual relations and to promote alternative or 
                                                               
5 BRICS Joint Declaration, 2011. 
6 Hurrell, 2006: 1–3. 
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complementary international forums and linkages beyond the predominant Western-dominated 
organisations’.7  
However, it is important to emphasize beforehand that the intensification of relations between the 
BRICS and the achievement of some successes should not mask the fact that the five BRICS countries 
may perhaps constitute a ‘political club’, but do not systematically form a bloc. The following 
section on the position of the BRICS in the UN will demonstrate this in more detail, but it is useful to 
point already in this context to some major differences and divergences which make the possibility of 
the BRICS dialogue being transformed into a strong BRICS bloc rather limited. The five countries indeed 
differ substantially: in terms of demographic, political, economic and military power and weight (see 
Table 1); in terms of internal political and societal system; and in terms of their regional and global 
ambitions.8  
Table 1: The BRICS: Indices of power 
  Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
Population in millions (2010) 194,946 142,958 1.224,614 1.341,355 50,133 
Surface area (in 100 sq km) 8.514,9 17.098,2 3.287,3 9.598,1 1.219,1 
GDP in billions of Euros (2010) 1.576,8 1.105,1 1.160,1 4.434,1 269,5 
GDP per capita in Euros (2010) 8.159,1 7.873,2 954,1 3.305,5 5.399,3 
EU27 import in million euro (2010) 32.320,4 158.384,9 33.147,3 282.011,1 17.912,1 
EU27 export in million euro (2010) 31.282,9 86.508,8 34.798,8 113.117,7 21.506,6 
Permanent member UNSC9 No Yes No Yes No 
Nuclear weapons10 No Yes Yes Yes No 
Military expenditure in million USD 
(2010) 
28,096 52,586 34,816 114,300 3,735 
Military expenditure as percentage 
of GDP (2009) 
1.6 4.3 2.8 2.2 1.3 
Active Military personnel (according 
to the IISS MB 2011) 
318,480 1,046,000 1,325,000 2,285,000  62,082 
Sources: European Commission DG Trade, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Arms Control Association, IISS Military Balance 
Generally, China has the greatest potential to act as a world power, while Brazil and South Africa stand 
out because they perform less well on most indices of power. Brazil, India and South Africa are full-
fledged democracies, whereas Russia is characterized by its ‘sovereign democracy’ and China rejects 
Western-inspired democratic reforms. China and Russia are both permanent members of the UNSC and, 
just as India, possess nuclear weapons. Importantly, in view of their different geographic situations, it is 
evident that they are concerned about, different parts of the world. To give three examples: events in 
Georgia, Taiwan or Kashmir ring a different bell in Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi. The various opposite 
interests, including the potential for territorial conflicts (particularly between Russia and China and 
                                                               
7 Keukeleire and Bruyninckx, 2011: 385. 
8 See also Cameron, 2011. 
9 Brazil is a non-permanent member of the UNSC until the end of 2011. India and South Africa until end-2012. 
10 Except for India all BRICS countries have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
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between China and India), are also an argument against the emergence of a coherent and amicable 
BRICS-bloc. 
 
1.2 VARIATIONS ON THE BRICS FORMAT AND ON ‘EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM’ 
The creation and development of the BRICS format has to be seen within the broader context of a 
growing number of emerging (or re-emerging) regional powers and contacts between these powers, 
including through a multitude of partially overlapping and complementary multilateral frameworks in 
the Southern hemisphere, in particular in the Asia-Pacific where Western countries are mostly not 
represented11 (see Figure 1). The BRICS phenomenon mirrors a general shift in the international 
balance of power, with the centre of gravity moving from the Euro-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific 
area and from the North and West to the South and East – the emergence of the G20 being yet 
another indication of this wider process (see 1.4). 
Firstly, increasing dialogue and cooperation in several variations on the BRICS format:  
? RIC: trilateral meetings with Russia, India and China (last year the 10th trilateral meeting of the 
Foreign Ministers of Russia, India and China was held);  
? IBSA: the trilateral IBSA initiative, which was formally launched in 2003 with India, Brazil and South 
Africa;  
? BASIC: the BASIC-format with Brazil, South Africa, India and China was launched in November 
2009 with a Joint Strategy for the UN Framework Convention Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
Copenhagen where they eventually sidelined the EU and negotiated a deal with the US. Since 
then, frequent ministerial meetings have taken place on these issues. 
? Bilateral relations: a large and increasing number of bilateral meetings are organized on various 
political, diplomatic and bureaucratic levels between the BRICS countries (particularly Russia-
China, Russia-India, India-China and Brazil-Russia). 
These variations on the BRICS-theme are not surprising in view of the differences and divergences, 
which exist between the five BRICS countries. These various formats can be seen as a sign of weakness 
of the BRICS formula, but can also be perceived as a sign of flexibility that allows the BRICS countries to 
choose the format, which best fits their purposes and to avoid divergences leading to inertia. The 
various formats seem to reinforce each other; statements issued in the context of one format often 
include references to the other formats. 
Secondly, Russia, China and India have been promoting the multilateralisation of their dialogues 
and trialogues and the inclusion of other countries in the region, with several international forums 
emerging in which particularly Russia, China and/or India play a role. These include: 
? the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), including Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, with India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia as observers);  
? the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Nine countries, including China, the EU and 
the USA possess observer status; 
? the ASEAN+3 process (including the ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and Korea);  
                                                               
11 Keukeleire and Bruyninckx, 2011: 397–401. 
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? the East Asia Summit, including China, India, together with other Asian countries as well as 
Australia and New Zealand; 
Thirdly, the major geo-economic and geo-political shift from the previously predominant 
Transatlantic area to the rising Asia-Pacific area is also reflected in the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC). APEC brings together 21 states in the Asia-Pacific region, including major powers 
such as China, the US and Russia and emerging or mid-sized powers in Asia (including ASEAN countries 
plus Japan and Korea), the American continent (Canada, Mexico, Peru and Chile), as well as Australia and 
New Zealand – accounting together for approximately 40% of the world's population, 44% of world 
trade and 54% of world GDP (APEC 2010). Most importantly, it provides a link between the increasingly 
important Asian continent and the still largest global political, economic and military power: the United 
States.  
All these international forums have one feature in common. It is a world where the EU is absent, where 
Europe is considered far away, and in most cases also as irrelevant – with the exception of the WTO, the 
G20 and some other multilateral forums where ‘Brussels’ and the European approaches have to be dealt 
with and, if necessary, countered or blocked. In this sense, in view of the differences between the BRICS 
countries, it is not in itself a problem that the EU has not developed a ‘BRICS policy’ and has focused on 
bilateral policies towards each of these countries separately. However, ‘it is more problematic that the 
EU has no policy to deal with the generally changing balance of power in the 21st century – a 
phenomenon in which the rise of the BRICs has to be situated’.12  
Interestingly, Europeans often dismiss these new forums for dialogue, coordination and cooperation as 
not really significant in view of the lack of legally binding commitments in these settings. However, it 
may be more adequate to recognize that the BRICS countries and the other Asian or Southern 
countries have made ‘the choice for multilateralism’ too – just like the Europeans – but that it is a 
choice for multilateralism based on fundamentally different principles with regard to both 
contents and approach. The way APEC presents itself is in this context quite illuminating and also 
illustrative of the other frameworks in which the BRICS countries do play a role13: 
[APEC] is the premier forum for facilitating economic growth, cooperation, trade and 
investment in the Asia-Pacific region. APEC is the only intergovernmental grouping in the 
world operating on the basis of non-binding commitments, open dialogue and equal 
respect for the views of all participants. Unlike the WTO or other multilateral trade bodies, 
APEC has no treaty obligations required of its participants. Decisions made within APEC 
are reached by consensus and commitments are undertaken on a voluntary basis.  
This description points to a clear prioritisation of economic growth and development, which can be 
linked to the reluctance of BRICS countries to let economic development be restricted by concerns in 
other policy domains that the Europeans consider important, such as environment, social protection or 
human rights. It points to a preference for a pure intergovernmental approach, with decision-making by 
consensus, absence of treaty obligations and voluntary commitments, which is opposed to the 
European preference for legally binding commitments and powerful international 
organisations/regimes. It reflects strong determination to protect national sovereignty – a principle also 
shared by the EU’s main partner, the United States.  
In other words, whereas the EU had hoped that its model of ‘effective multilateralism’ (based on legally 
binding commitments and treaties) would gradually become the global standard, with the interaction 
                                                               
12 Ibid: 385. 
13 APEC, 2010. 
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between the EU and UN becoming an increasingly important point of reference,14 the EU, in fact, sees 
itself increasingly marginalised with regard to the way the international scene is structured. The EU was 
regularly blinded by the references to effective multilateralism in its partnerships and other agreements 
with the individual BRICS countries, leading to the false impression that these were all ‘Partnerships for 
effective multilateralism’.15  
Figure 1: The BRICS and other emerging powers and multilateral frameworks 
 
Note: Own design by Yannick Schoensetters and Stephan Keukeleire (based on Keukeleire and Bruyninckx, 2011: 400). 
                                                               
14 European Commission, 2003; Laatikainen and Smith, 2006; Wouters et al., 2008. 
15 Grevi and Vasconcelos, 2008. 
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Figure 1 gives an overview of the various partially overlapping and complementary emerging 
constellations of power and multilateral frameworks in the southern part of the world, Asia and the 
Pacific. It reflects an increasingly dense set of formal and informal networks and personal and 
professional contacts between a growing number of ministers, diplomats, senior as well as specialized 
civil servants and agencies which are responsible for a continuously widening set of policy issues and 
which meet each other more and more in various forums in addition to their bilateral contacts. 
Interestingly, neither the BRICS nor any of the other variations or multilateral frameworks can be 
considered as really coherent, powerful and influential as such. Nor does this increasing number of 
meetings lead to real ‘hard’ decisions. However, these rather diffuse overlapping sets of 
bilateralisms, trilateralism and multilateralism do increasingly have an impact on the outcome of 
international negotiations, because they inform and impact upon the national positions of the 
various participating countries as well as upon UN negotiations and various specialized international 
negotiation processes.  
The clearest and for the Europeans most painful example of this emerging and increasingly important 
set of partially overlapping multilateral forums was the marginalization of the EU in the Climate 
Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009. The Copenhagen Accord was essentially brokered by 
the BASIC countries and Australia, thereby successfully representing and defending the ‘Southern’ 
position in the climate change debate, with the US managing to break into the deal and the EU 
being largely sidelined. In the final stage of the conference, these countries formulated the accord 
outside of the formal negotiations dynamic, with the fundamental option (not to accept binding 
commitments) being taken, not in Copenhagen itself, but at the preceding APEC meeting in Singapore 
in November 2009. It illustrates that the BRICS and other emerging powers’ interpretation of and choice 
for multilateralism was in fact a ‘choice for multilateralism’, and they were effective in using the various 
multilateral frameworks to impact upon the final result in the way they prefer.16 For an extended 
discussion of the climate change negotiations, see Section 1.4. 
 
1.3 VOTING PATTERNS OF THE BRICS IN THE UN 
This section seeks to answer questions related to the voting patterns of the BRICS countries at the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Do the BRICS countries vote as a bloc? What are the 
implications of these outcomes for the EU?  
Before moving to the analysis of the BRICS countries’ cohesion in the UNGA, it is useful to explain why 
this study focuses on the voting pattern in the UNGA and not – as might seem more logical – on voting 
in the more important UN Security Council (UNSC). The first reason is that only Russia and China are 
permanent members of the Security Council and that the UNSC rarely includes all five BRICS countries – 
which makes a comparative analysis of the voting cohesion of the BRICS countries in the UNSC over a 
longer period of time impossible. However, as was already pointed out in Section 1.1, an exceptional 
situation occurred in 2011 when, by chance, not only China and Russia, but also Brazil, India and South 
Africa were part of the UN’s most powerful body, as non-permanent members. This appears to provide 
a perfect context to assess the voting cohesion of the BRICS in the UNSC during that year. A survey of 
the voting behaviour illuminates that the BRICS countries cast identical votes on 37 of the 38 UNSC 
resolutions voted upon in 2011 until 1 September.17 The only resolution were split votes were cast was 
Resolution 1973 on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya where Brazil, China, India and Russia 
                                                               
16 Keukeleire and Bruyninckx, 2011: 399–400. 
17 Website UN Security Council, 2011. 
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abstained and South Africa voted ‘yes’.18 However, this high extent of cohesion is not particularly 
remarkable. In 36 of the 38 UNSC resolutions, which were voted upon in the UNSC in the first eight 
months of 2011, all 15 Security Council members voted in favour of the resolution. This confirms what 
Drieskens and Bouchard note: ‘the UNSC largely operates by consensus and divisive issues are rarely 
pushed to a vote’.19 This means that the BRICS score is part of a broader coalition, and that analysing the 
voting cohesion of these five countries in the UNSC does not tell us that much.20 
This analysis therefore provides a quantitative analysis of the voting cohesion of the five BRICS 
countries in the UNGA and in the Main Committees of the UNGA in the period 2006–2011, thereby 
covering five sessions of the UN General Assembly from the 61st session to the 65th session.21 The year 
2006 is chosen as the first year in the analysis since the political dialogue on the margins of the UNGA 
meeting started between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Russia, India and China in that year. 
This analysis also includes the voting behaviour of South Africa in the last five sessions of the UNGA, to 
allow for a comparative analysis of the BRICS framework in that period. South Africa only became part of 
the BRIC(S) in January 2011, some months after the start of the 65th session. 
The method used to measure the level of voting cohesion between the BRICS countries is to examine – 
on the total number of resolutions in the UNGA that were accepted after a vote – in how many cases 
(both in absolute terms and in percentage) resolutions were passed with complete agreement, partial 
agreement or complete disagreement between the five BRICS countries.22 In this study, the following 
criteria were used to determine whether complete agreement, partial agreement or complete 
disagreement exists:23 
? Complete agreement implies that the BRICS countries cast identical votes (either yes or no) or 
that they were all abstaining; 
? Partial agreement implies that most BRICS countries voted either yes or no, but that one or more 
of the BRICS countries were abstaining; 
? Complete disagreement implies that at least two BRICS countries cast opposite votes (this means 
that at least one country voted for and at least one country against). 
Before moving to the results of this quantitative analysis, it is useful to enter some caveats.24 Most 
importantly, only a 20–30% minority of the resolutions voted upon, which means that the vast majority 
of the UNGA resolutions pass the UNGA without vote.25 In addition, only passed resolutions are 
recorded as specified by the UN, others are only given the numbers of countries that voted in favour, 
against or abstained. Additionally, as was already mentioned with regard to the UNGA, cohesion 
between BRICS states can be part of much broader cohesion among the UN members, hence 
diminishing the relevance of the cohesion found in this study. Furthermore, Drieskens notes that the 
concept of voting cohesion does not have similar ‘explanatory power’ for the different UN bodies. 
Meaning that it ‘may be a powerful tool for measuring regional actorness at the UNGA, but not for the 
                                                               
18 United Nations Bibliographic Information System, 2011. 
19 Drieskens and Bouchard, 2012. 
20 Generally, the veto right that permanent members possess is seldom used (usually once or twice a year). It is thus more the 
threat of the veto than its actual use that functions as a major obstacle. 
21 Sessions of the UNGA always start in September. The 66th session is not included in this analysis since this session started 
only on 13 September 2011. 
22 For a quantitative analysis measuring ‘voting distance’ between BRIC countries, see Hooijmaaijers, 2011. 
23 The UN categorizes the votes on resolutions as ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘abstain and ‘absent’. To fit this in the categories used in this 
study, ‘absent’ will be seen as ‘abstaining’, since both categories have non-voting in common. 
24 See e.g. Kissack, 2007. 
25 Luif, 2003: 22 
Policy Department DG External Policies 
 12
UNSC’.26 Finally, a quantitative analysis should ideally also be complemented by a detailed qualitative 
assessment of each vote in order, firstly, to detect the context and importance of the resolutions – not 
every resolution is as significant, either in general or for the EU – and, secondly, to learn more about the 
context and meaning of the voting behaviour of the five BRICS countries. For instance, abstaining can 
have different political meanings in different contexts. However, such a detailed qualitative assessment 
is not possible within the scope of this study. 
Nevertheless, since the UNGA is ‘the only forum in which a large number of states meet and vote on a 
regular basis on issues concerning the international community’,27 the voting behaviour in this forum 
can still function as a useful political barometer and provide a useful indicator of the degree of cohesion 
among the BRICS countries. However, this voting behaviour is merely one indicator of the general 
cohesion in the foreign policy of the BRICS countries. 
 
Table 2: Overall BRICS cohesion in the UN General Assembly (number and percentage of 
resolutions) 
 2006–2007        2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 
Complete agreement 53 61,6% 47 59,5% 44 57,9% 39 56,5% 46 63,0% 
Partial agreement 27 31,4% 24 30,4% 27 35,5% 24 34,8% 21 28,8% 
Complete disagreement 6 7,0% 8 10,1% 5 6,6% 6 8,7% 6 8,2% 
Resolutions with vote 86 100% 79 100% 76 100% 69 100% 73 100% 
Source: Data retrieved from unbisnet.un.org  
Table 2 demonstrates that in the period 2006–2011 the BRICS countries were in complete agreement 
regarding only 56–63% of the resolutions that were voted upon, in partial agreement regarding 28–
35% of resolutions, and in complete disagreement regarding 6–10% of resolutions. Overall, it is not 
possible to discern a BRICS-bloc in the UNGA in that time-period. Another conclusion that can be 
drawn is that there is no significant increase of voting cohesion since the start of the 
consultations in the BRIC framework in 2006. There is slightly more full agreement in 2010–2011 
than in the preceding three years, but it is impossible to tell whether this reflects the start of intensified 
BRICS consultation and a tendency towards more cohesion (all the BRICS being in 2011 members of the 
UNSC and adoption of the Action Plan). Discerning possible long-term trends will only be possible after 
a few years. 
Further insight can be gained by also looking at the level of cohesion in the subsidiary organs of the 
General Assembly, which prepare the work of the plenary meeting of the Assembly and which draft 
resolutions and decisions. In this study, we focus on the three ‘Main Committees’ of the UN General 
Assembly that are concerned with foreign policy issues.28 Table 3 shows that complete agreement 
occurs in the Disarmament and International Security Committee (or ‘First Committee’) in less than half of 
the cases: complete agreement existed indeed with regard to only 28–46% of the resolutions voted 
upon in the period 2006–2011. Moreover, as far as trends can be derived from a period of only five 
years, the table rather points to a trend of decreasing agreement among the BRICS. Complete 
                                                               
26 Drieskens, 2012. 
27 Voeten, 2000: 185–186. 
28 The other ‘Main Committees’, which are left out in the analysis, are the Economic and Financial Committee (Second 
Committee), the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee) and the Legal Committee (Sixth Committee). 
These are committees, which rarely or never vote.  
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disagreement only occurred on a limited number of issues. India cast opposite votes compared to the 
other BRICS countries on several resolutions regarding a nuclear-weapon-free world, which can be 
explained by the fact that India has not signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
India also cast an opposite vote on the resolution on conventional arms control at the regional and sub-
regional levels. Russia cast opposite votes on the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International 
Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.  
 
Table 3: BRICS cohesion in Disarmament and International Security Committee (number 
and % of resolutions) 
 2006–2007        2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 
Complete agreement 14 46,7% 11 42,3% 11 39,3% 6 28,5% 8 34,8% 
Partial agreement 12 40,0% 10 38,5% 14 50,0% 10 47,6% 12 52,2% 
Complete disagreement 4 13,3% 5 19,2% 3 10,7% 5 23,8% 3 13,0% 
Resolutions with vote 30 100% 26 100% 28 100% 21 100% 23 100% 
Source: Data retrieved from unbisnet.un.org 
The Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee (or ‘Third Committee’) is quite important from a foreign 
policy perspective, as it is in this committee that issues related to human rights are tackled. 
Interestingly, complete agreement among the BRICS countries occurred in only a small majority of the 
resolutions that were voted upon (fluctuating between 52% and 67%), besides the significant number 
of partial agreements and a limited number of complete disagreements. China and India recorded more 
opposite votes than the other BRICS countries in the years 2007, 2008 and 2010 on the moratorium on 
the use of the death penalty. China, India and Russia took opposite positions from Brazil and South 
Africa in the entire 2006–2011 period on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. In 2006–2008, Brazil 
voted for and South Africa abstained, while in 2009 and 2010 Brazil abstained and South Africa voted in 
favour of this resolution. Furthermore, both China and Russia did so in 2006, 2007 and 2010 on the 
resolutions concerning the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In 
2006 and 2007, Brazil voted in favour of this resolution, China and Russia opposed, with the other two 
abstaining. In 2010, both China and Russia voted against the resolution on North Korea with the other 
three abstaining. 
 
Table 4: BRICS cohesion in the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee (number and 
% of resolutions) 
 2006–2007        2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 
Complete agreement 11 52,4% 13 61,9% 10 52,6% 10 66,7% 10 62,5% 
Partial agreement 8 38,1% 5 23,8% 7 36,8% 4 26,7% 3 18,8% 
Complete disagreement 2 9,5% 3 14,3% 2 10,5% 1 6,7% 3 18,8% 
Resolutions with vote 21 100% 21 100% 19 100% 15 100% 16 100% 
Source: Data retrieved from unbisnet.un.org 
The Fourth Committee or Special Political and Decolonization Committee deals with decolonization and a 
variety of political subjects, which are not dealt with by the First and the Third Committee. This 
committee is particularly interesting since three of the BRICS countries have a colonial past (Brazil, India 
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and South Africa) and since it also deals with one of the most sensitive issues in global politics: the 
Israel-Palestine dispute. On the vast majority of the resolutions that touch upon decolonization issues 
and the Israel-Palestine dispute, the BRICS countries cast identical votes (fluctuating between 75% and 
88% of the resolutions). Importantly, there were no full disagreements in this Committee between the 
BRICS countries in the period 2006–2011 and this is also the only Main Committee where a tendency 
towards more cohesion amongst the BRICS countries can be discerned. In the past five years, it was only 
Russia that abstained in a limited number of cases and that therefore cast split votes with the other 
BRICS countries: on resolutions concerning the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices 
Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and concerning the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. On these issues, Russia 
abstained while the other BRICS voted in favour of it. For comparison, the EU member states generally 
abstain on these issues with only two exceptions in recent years: Austria on Palestinian people and 
Spain on colonial countries and peoples, both in 2007.  
 
Table 5: BRICS cohesion in the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (number 
and % of resolutions) 
 2006–2007        2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 
Complete agreement 12 75,0% 12 85,7% 12 85,7% 12 85,7% 15 88,2% 
Partial agreement 4 25,0% 2 14,3% 2 14,3% 2 14,3% 2 11,8% 
Complete disagreement 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
Resolutions with vote 16 100% 14 100% 14 100% 14 100% 17 100% 
Source: Data retrieved from unbisnet.un.org 
The data on the voting behaviour of the BRICS countries in the three foreign policy related Main 
Committees provide some more insight into the nature of the BRICS countries’ cohesion (although 
prudence is required in view of the caveats that were formulated earlier). Compared to the 
assessment of the overall cohesion in the UNGA, BRICS cohesion seems even more limited with 
regard to resolutions related to disarmament and international security, but stronger with 
regard to resolutions passed in the Special Political and Decolonization Committee. Whereas 
limited bloc formation might be detected in the latter committee, this is not at all the case in the 
Disarmament and International Security Committee or in the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural 
Committee. 
As mentioned in section 1.1, it remains rather unclear what the extent of meetings between BRICS 
nations officials is and therefore it is hard to depict the number of cases where the BRICS nations 
coordinated their positions. Nonetheless, the launch of the BRICS Action Plan suggests a formalisation 
of their relations on a broad field. Despite these intentions, however, the data over the past five years 
does not show a clear sign of a systematic increase of the BRICS cohesion at the UNGA, and therefore 
currently the BRICS can hardly be seen as a cohesive bloc.  
What are the implications for the EU of the dual conclusion that the BRICS countries are not operating as 
a cohesive bloc at the UNGA and that there is also no clear sign of a significant increase of the BRICS 
cohesion in the period 2006–2011? For the time being, the data does not provide an argument for 
the EU to approach this group of countries as a bloc. It may therefore be more worthwhile for the 
EU to engaging more intensively with separate BRICS countries or with other configurations of 
the five BRICS countries.   
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Table 6: Overall complete agreement among the five constellations (number and 
percentage of resolutions) 
 2006–2007        2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 
BRICS 53 61,6% 47 59,5% 44 57,9% 39 56,5% 46 63,0% 
BRIC 54 62,8% 48 60,8% 44 57,9% 40 58,0% 46 63,0% 
RIC 61 70,9% 53 67,1% 50 65,8% 45 65,2% 47 64,4% 
BASIC 60 69,8% 55 69,6% 49 64,5% 50 72,5% 56 76,7% 
IBSA 62 72,1% 58 73,4% 56 73,7% 52 75,4% 60 82,2% 
Source: Data retrieved from unbisnet.un.org 
A closer look at the voting behaviour in the several variations on the BRICS format shows that the 
highest degree of cohesion can be found In the IBSA format (India, Brazil and South Africa), which 
also reflects the different nature of these three countries in comparison with China and Russia. Over the 
period of five years, the percentages of full agreement are significantly higher than in the case of the 
BRICS constellation. Removing Russia and China from the analysis, we find that India, Brazil and South 
Africa cast identical votes in 70% of resolutions (in 2010 even over 80%). Compared to the roughly 60% 
of the BRICS constellation, this can be seen as quite a significant difference. The cohesion of the BASIC 
configuration (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) is overall somewhat lower compared to that of IBSA, 
but with an average complete agreement of 70%, it remains significantly higher than the BRICS voting 
cohesion. The RIC variation (Russia, India and China) shows a 65–70% of identical votes cast, making this 
percentage insignificantly lower than for the BASIC countries. The original BRIC countries’ overall 
percentage of full agreement is, not surprisingly, situated around 60 percent, between the BRICS score 
and RIC score. In short: the ranking from high to low when it comes to overall voting coincidence at 
the UN General Assembly over the 2006–2010 period is IBSA, BASIC, RIC, BRIC, and ultimately 
BRICS. 
This ranking may suggest that the EU may chose to primarily focus on the IBSA countries, not only 
because they are the most cohesive group, but also because the nature of their political system is most 
similar to that of the EU countries. However, a closer look at specific foreign policy issues 
demonstrates that engaging more with the IBSA countries is not self-evident. This is also the case 
in a domain, which is highly important for the EU: human rights. The analysis of Gowan and Brantner29 
on the EU and human rights at the UN confirms that the positions of particularly Brazil and South Africa 
are closer to the positions of the EU than those of the other BRICS countries since China, India and 
Russia cast identical votes with the EU in only 25% of the cases. Brazil and South Africa can also be 
considered as swing voters, which can be useful for the EU in view of developing a strategy aimed at 
gaining more support for its positions. However, both counties consider respect for national 
sovereignty, non-intervention and equality between nations as very important, which also implies that 
they often consider these values as more important than the promotion of human rights and 
democracy, which explains their divergence with the EU’s positions.30 Although Brazil is labeled by 
Gowan and Brantner as belonging to the group of ‘Liberal Internationalists’, the voting coincidence at 
the UN General Assembly with the EU member states remained on a level of less than 50%.31 South 
Africa is even more clearly part of what they call the ‘Axis of Sovereignty’, which is a group of countries 
that casts identical votes with the EU member states less than 35% of the time.  
                                                               
29 Gowan and Brantner, 2010: 4. 
30 Kumar, 2008. 
31 Gowan and Brantner, 2010. 
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Some examples can help to illustrate that the EU cannot automatically count on the IBSA countries, not 
even on Brazil and South Africa. In the 2010/2011 UNGA session, EU member states voted unanimously 
in favour of the resolution on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran. China and 
Russia, together with 43 other states, voted against this resolution, while Brazil, India and South Africa, 
together with 56 others, abstained. On the resolution concerning the situation of human rights in 
Myanmar the EU finds itself again situated opposite both China and Russia. In this case, India as well as 
23 other states joined their coalition, Brazil abstained, and only South Africa voted similar as the EU27. A 
similar situation can be observed on the adopted UNGA resolution on the situation of human rights in 
the North Korea. The EU cast identical votes in favour of this resolution, China and Russia voted against, 
India and South Africa as well as 55 others abstained, while Brazil voted together with the EU member 
states.32  
Moreover, although Brazil and South Africa can at least be seen as so-called swing voters, a 
worrying trend for the EU over the past few years is that both have been moving away from the 
EU and its viewpoints. Another worrying trend for the EU is that it is not only usually lined up against 
China and Russia, but also that ‘the overall level of support for China and Russia has grown 
significantly’.33 The same pattern appears in the Human Rights Council (HRC) where the EU’s actual 
influence is lacking, despite the fact that the EU generally speaks with one voice, and where China and 
Russia also actively oppose EU positions.34 
This quite worrisome situation for the EU indicates that it is important for the EU and its member 
states to actively engage with South Africa, Brazil and possibly also India – which, however, 
requires from the EU that it listens more carefully to their positions and takes more into account 
their interests. Engaging more actively with these countries is particularly important as the IBSA 
countries often have a higher international credibility than the EU in Africa, Asia and Latin America. This 
is also reflected in the fact that these countries often take the position of one of the IBSA countries as a 
point of reference for determining their own position when casting a vote in the UNGA and its various 
Committees. This also means that if the EU can manage to convince one or more of the IBSA countries 
to join the EU position, a significant number of other countries may follow, which, in turn, may increase 
the ability of the EU to find sufficient support for its positions.  
 
1.4 IMPACT ON DECISION-MAKING OF NEW INTERNATIONAL FORUMS 
The emerging powers’ increasing importance is reflected also in the informal forums of global 
governance, within which two key trends can be observed.35 Firstly, these informal forums have become 
increasingly important in addressing global challenges and crises. Secondly, the role of Western-
dominated informal cooperation manifested in the G8 and G7 is decreasing,36 while the role of broader 
forums, such as the G20, as well as new forms of cooperation among the key emerging powers (such as 
BRICS, BASIC and IBSA cooperation) has increased. 
                                                               
32 UN Bibliographic Information System, 2011. 
33 Gowan and Brantner, 2010: 1-2, 25. 
34 Smith, 2010. 
35 Jokela, 2011. 
36 Russia has participated in the G-7 post summit dialogues since 1991. The 1998 Birmingham Summit saw full Russian 
participation, giving birth to the Group of Eight, or G8 (although the G7 continued to function alongside the formal 
summits). 
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The BRICS countries share the objective of making key informal groups more inclusive and they 
played an important role in promoting the G20 as the world’s new premium forum of economic 
cooperation. They have also achieved concrete goals. The G20 was set up at a ministerial level in 1999 
in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. In 2007, the G8 started regular structured cooperation with 
five key emerging powers (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa), and in 2008 – in the midst of 
global financial crisis – the G20 was upgraded to the leaders’ level. 
Currently, prospects for increasing BRICS cooperation do exist. Firstly, while the G7 – at the level of 
finance ministers and central bank governors – has retained some of its relevance in the field of financial 
issues, the G8 is relevant in many other fields of global governance.  Secondly, the size of the G20 – 
comprising 19 states and the EU, as well as invited representatives from other relevant states and 
international organizations – points towards the role of coalition formation within the G20. The 
coordination among ‘sub-groups’ of the G20 is most noticeable between EU members and institutions. 
The G20 agenda is also addressed directly and indirectly in the G8 and G7 groups because of their 
overlapping agenda with the G20. Furthermore, and as suggested in section 1.1, the G20 has been high 
on the agenda of BRIC/BRICS cooperation.  
The key question of this section is whether commitment to the G20 process has led to common 
positions and coordination among the BRICS countries also on the more concrete level of agenda-
setting and policy-making in the G20 and other new forums. In our analysis,37 we focus on four issues of 
potential BRICS cooperation within the G20 that have been particularly visible on the BRICS countries’ 
G20 agendas: (i) reforming the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank);  (ii) the regulation of cross-border capital flows; (iii) improving the international reserve 
currency system; and (iv) climate change. Significantly, in several of these issues the BRICS countries 
have emerged as initiators of the debate in the G20. Moreover, in addition to sharing some objectives, 
certain coordination of strategies can be discerned from their actions.   
The G20 and the BRICS summits clearly have an overlapping agenda in reforming the formal 
multilateral system of global financial and economic governance. In the very first G20 communiqué, the 
purpose of the G20 was described as ‘to provide a new mechanism for informal dialogue in the 
framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system, to broaden the discussions on key economic and 
financial policy issues among systemically significant economies and promote co-operation to achieve 
stable and sustainable world economic growth that benefits all’.38 The main focus of the first BRIC 
summit in June 2009 was strikingly similar.  In the spotlight was the global economic situation and 
enhancing BRIC cooperation to push forward the reform of global financial and economic governance 
institutions.  
Reforming the Bretton Woods institutions. The Bretton Woods institution reform came onto the agenda of 
G20 during the Chinese chairmanship in the Xianghe meeting of finance ministers and central bank 
governors in October 2005. In conjunction with this meeting, the G20 issued a statement on reforming 
the Bretton Woods institutions. The two main substantive points of the statement are: that quotas and 
representation should reflect changes in economic weight, and that selection of senior management 
should be based on merit and ensure broad representation of all member countries.39 Both are points 
that the BRICS countries have keenly advocated.  
                                                               
37 It should be noted that studying the G20 is hampered by a data problem. Since G20 deliberations are secret and only 
produce final communications, it is not easy to deduce which positions various countries take in the discussion. 
38 G20 communiqué, 1999. 
39 The G20 Statement on Reforming Bretton Woods Institutions, 2005. 
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After 2005, BRICS countries have kept up the pressure on this issue in the G20. BRICS summits 
have consistently called for greater voice and representativeness, both through a substantial 
shift in voting power and by diversifying personnel selection procedures in these organisations.40  
On this issue, the interests of BRICS countries converge. Until recently, the gap between emerging 
economies’ real weight in the global economy and their voting power in the IMF had grown ever wider. 
Recognising this imbalance, the previous managing director of the IMF launched a strategic review of 
the IMF that resulted in a reallocation of quotas and votes in 2008. In the November 2010 G20 Seoul 
meeting, a second round of reallocations was agreed on. Some of the IMF voting rights would be 
reallocated from developed to emerging economies, with dynamic emerging and developing countries 
receiving an increase in voting shares of 5.7 percentage points (8.8 percentage points compared to pre-
2008 reform). In addition to this, Europe would initially lose two of its 10 seats on the executive board. 
Ultimately, Europe’s seats would be reduced to only two or three.41  
Cross-border capital flows. At the G20 Seoul Summit in November 2010, the issue of cross-border capital 
flows was also put high on the agenda. The G20 Seoul Declaration refers to the need to pursue ‘further 
work on macro-prudential policy frameworks, including tools to help mitigate the impact of excessive 
capital flows’.42 The issue has since proved highly contentious, and a division between the BRICS and 
the G7 countries has emerged. The BRICS countries have wanted to reserve the right to deploy capital 
controls in order to limit excessive inflows of speculative capital that could put their economic stability 
at risk. The EU has expressed its concern over the unilateral use of capital controls, declaring in the G20 
terms-of-reference document ‘the EU believes in the benefits of the free movement of capital […] and 
sees with some concern the increasing use of temporary controls’.43 Despite the hesitance on the part 
of the EU and the USA, the BRICS countries have been able to shape the terms of the debate as well 
as block the (G7-dominated) IMF proposals on capital controls.  
Reflecting the growing power of the BRICS countries in propagating their interests into global 
discussions within the G20, the IMF has recently re-examined its position on the issue of capital controls. 
It has recognized that capital flows can be disruptive and that the careful use of capital controls may be 
needed to smooth such disruption.44 As such, the current discussion no longer revolves around the 
legitimacy of controls as such, but rather on the need for a global regime to regulate capital flows. 
France, Germany and ECB officials together with the US have called for the IMF to be given a strong role 
in coordinating and sanctioning the use of capital controls. Accordingly, in preparation for its annual 
meeting in April 2011, the IMF released a report45 in which it proposes a set of rules for the use of capital 
controls.  
The BRICS countries, however, have effectively vetoed this IMF framework. At their meeting in China on 
14 April 2011, the BRICS countries expressed their concern about the IMF proposal. Their position came 
out on the eve of the IMF and the World Bank’s developing countries group meeting, also known as the 
G24. At the behest of Brazil, India, and South Africa, the G24 subsequently also rejected the IMF 
proposal, stating in a communiqué their disagreement ‘with the proposed framework for staff advice to 
member countries on managing capital flows’.46 Finally, at the G20 ministerial meeting the same day in 
Washington, the BRICS, led by Brazil, refused to endorse the IMF’s proposed framework, which 
                                                               
40 See e.g. the 2010 BRICS summit declaration. 
41 ADB, 2011: 18-19. 
42 The G20, 2010. 
43 Strupczewski, 2011. 
44 Cf. Gallagher, 2011. 
45 IMF, 2011. 
46 G24, 2011. 
The EU Foreign Policy towards the BRICS and other Emerging powers: objectives and strategies 
 19
effectively sent the IMF back to the drawing board. Hence, as a result of BRICS’ resistance the G20 has so 
far not been able to agree on a proposal to put limits on capital controls.    
Improving the international reserve currency system. The reserve currency issue was initially pushed onto 
the global agenda by a series of three articles penned by the Chinese central bank governor, Zhou 
Xiaochuan, in March 2009. Zhou argued that the world should gradually move away from dollar-
centricity and discussed options that included more extensive use of IMF Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs).47 However, the issue was controversial even within the Chinese government itself, with Foreign 
Ministry officials privately downplaying the importance of Zhou’s statements.48 The reserve currency 
issue was briefly discussed at the G20 meeting in London in 2009 and presumably in the first BRIC 
summit two months later in Yekaterinburg. The Russian president’s calls for reserve currency system 
reform in the run up to the summit did not, however, then lead to a publicly announced joint BRIC 
position. 
With the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and American unilateral moves of quantitative easing in 2010, 
the reserve currency issue has stayed on the BRIC/BRICS summit agendas. In the Sanya meeting in 
China, 14 April 2011, the final declaration contained a passage on the need to reform the 
international reserve currency system, which resonates with the earlier views expressed by the 
Chinese central bank. The BRICS stated that they ‘support the reform and improvement of the 
international monetary system, with a broad-based international reserve currency system providing 
stability and certainty’ and they welcomed ‘the current discussion about the role of the SDR in the 
existing international monetary system including the composition of SDR's basket of currencies’.49 
Climate change. From the mid-2000s the importance of climate change in the summit agendas of the G8 
and later the G20 has increased significantly. This largely reflects the recognized need to tackle the issue 
of climate change on multiple fronts.50 The Copenhagen Climate Summit is one of the key events in 
which the emerging powers increased influence and joint strategy in international climate diplomacy 
was clearly manifested. In Copenhagen, China, India, Brazil and South Africa appeared not only to 
share important objectives, but also played a key role in negotiating the conference’s final 
outcome with the USA.51  
Russia’s modest role in Copenhagen is another significant observation. It suggests that cooperation 
among emerging powers can take several forms, reflecting the interests at stake in different issue areas. 
While it is plausible to focus on BRICS cooperation in some fields of global governance, such as 
global financial governance, BASIC cooperation (among Brazil, South Africa, India and China) 
appears to be the key trend on climate issues. 
The emergence of the BASIC group has been seen largely as a response to external pressures. Their 
increasing emissions have resulted in demands for them (in particular for China and India) to accept 
compulsory emission targets. After Copenhagen, the group’s relevance has been further highlighted. 
BASIC ministers responsible for climate-related matters have met regularly. According to a recent study 
on their cooperation, two clear joint policy lines have emerged. Firstly, they have called for a second 
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commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Secondly, they have highlighted efforts to build bridges with 
the G77 grouping under the UNFCC.52 
Some divisions within the BASIC cooperation have also surfaced. The countries have, for instance, tried 
to establish a common position on equity as well as on how the remaining carbon space should be 
shared among countries.53 Nevertheless, reaching a consensus has been difficult.54 At times, BASIC 
countries also seem to proceed without paying attention to each other. India’s recent attempts to 
broker an agreement through the needs-based concept ‘equitable access to sustainable development’ 
in the Cancun climate meeting (COP16 of the UNFCC) was seen as a positive opening, but it did not 
emerge directly via BASIC cooperation. The BASIC cooperation may yet prove to be a temporary and 
issue-specific development, but given the broader developments, it might also open up opportunities 
for its members to enhance cooperation also in other fields than climate diplomacy.  
The BRICS in informal fora. In summary, we suggest that there are three main ways in which the BRICS 
countries have sought to influence G20: agenda-setting; shifting the terms of the debate; and 
blocking. Moreover, we argue that different forms of informal cooperation and coordination among 
the BRICS countries are an increasingly important part of the informal forums of global governance, 
such as the G20.  
In terms of agenda-setting, the BRICS countries have been successful in initiating new 
discussions and bringing new issues to the G20 table. This has been done either by the BRICS as a 
group or by one of the BRICS countries, with varying support from the others. Arguably, the issue of IMF 
reforms and representativeness has seen a rather united BRICS front that successfully pushed the issue 
on the agenda, and kept it up, resulting in actual changes. Reforming the reserve currency system may 
conceivably prove to be a similar case. Although here it is still too early to tell, as the BRICS countries 
only recently adopted a stronger common position on it and the issue has so far not figured 
prominently on the G20 agenda.  
The BRICS countries have also been moderately successful in shifting the terms of the debate on 
some key issues, most clearly in the case of capital controls. The IMF has first come to accept some 
capital controls in principle, and more recently its proposal to address the issue has been challenged 
effectively by the BRICS.  
Finally, the BRICS countries, while not always acting as a coherent political bloc, may still be able 
to effectively block initiatives as an ad hoc bloc formation, when the countries’ interests align. 
The clearest example is the outcome of the Copenhagen climate negotiations. This development 
points to a sort of de facto veto – it is increasingly hard to achieve results unless the BRICS are on board. 
On global challenges, the BRICS-in-G20 platform then hands India, Brazil and South Africa some 
measure of veto power that they otherwise lack, due to not having permanent United Nations Security 
Council seats. 
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1.5 PERCEPTIONS 
A common belief in Europe is that non-Europeans’ perceptions towards the EU and Europe are positive. 
However, a quite sobering view is offered by the 2011 PEW Global Attitudes Survey, which brings 
together the results of worldwide public opinion surveys.55 Although one should be carefully with 
drawing conclusions since the scope of the PEW research was only limited to a period of two years, 
some results of the survey are worth to be mentioned. The survey demonstrates a worldwide decline 
of the overall image of the EU between 2010 and 2011, which is also reflected in the opinion polls 
in the BRIC countries (South Africa was not among the nations surveyed by the PEW Research Center). 
 
Table 7: Views of the EU in the BRIC countries (in percentage of favourability) 
 Brazil Russia India China 
2010 55 69 X 47 
2011 47 64 23 32 
Source: PEW Research Center Global Attitudes Project (2011: 61-63) 
As Table 7 indicates, positive perceptions are the highest in EU neighbour Russia, with 64% of the 
participating people in the PEW Survey favourable to the EU in 2011. Significantly lower, however, were 
the scores in China and India. With a measured score of percentage favourable towards the EU of 47% in 
2010 and 32% in 2011, the ratings significantly dropped over the last year. Remarkably, the Indians rate 
the EU even lower with a score of only 23% for 2011.56 Furthermore, in all these countries there is a 
decline in favourability in the 2010–2011 period.  
The sobering findings of the PEW Research Center scholars are confirmed by scholarly work on the 
external perceptions on the EU. In their analysis of EU relations with the IBSA countries, Olivier and 
Fioramonti underline that several disputes resulted in a less favourable image of the EU: ‘[a]gricultural 
subsidies, non-tariff barriers and other protectionist measures against emerging economies of the 
“global south” contribute to reinforcing the perception of the EU as a neo-colonial power’.57 Fioramonti 
and Lucarelli note that the EU is perceived by both China and Russia as rather weak in the field of 
international politics.58 These findings can be seen as a confirmation of previous conclusions by Lucarelli 
that ‘the external image of the EU is not one of great distinctiveness’.59 Worrying for the EU is also the 
gap which Fioramonti and Poletti noticed between the EU’s self-perception as a positive normative 
power and the way it is perceived by third countries. The EU as a global actor determined by its core 
values of democracy, human rights, solidarity, sustainable development and the rule of law ‘is belied by 
the common perceptions of the leading nations of the global South’, i.e. Brazil, India and South Africa.60  
This gap in perception of the EU is formulated even more sharply by non-European observers, 
who regularly lament the EU’s inability to adapt to the changing world context and to adopt a 
more modest attitude towards the rest of the world. Sharpest in his criticism against Europe and the 
West in general is Kishore Mahbubani, an influential Asian public intellectual, former Singaporean 
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diplomat and author of The New Asian Hemisphere. The Irresistible Shift of Global Power.61 In a recent 
contribution to ‘Europe’s World’ he emphasises that ‘[t]he biggest strategic flaw in the EU’s policies 
towards Asia is the assumption that these policies can continue on autopilot, even when the world is 
changing rapidly and Asia keeps rising so steadily’. He also criticizes the EU’s misplaced smugness and 
advises the EU that ‘[a]ll hints of arrogance and condescension should be scrubbed out of its strategy 
documents’, as the EU could also learn lessons from Asia.62 He also points to what he considers as 
Europe’s main strategic errors: ‘to remain obsessed with the transatlantic relationship’ and ‘to ignore its 
No. 1 strategic opportunity: Asia’. Or, as he continues, ‘[i]f Europe could think and act strategically, it 
would be busy knocking on Asian doors’, but this exactly what is not happening.63 In the next part, we 
assess in more detail the EU’s strategic partnerships with the five BRICS countries. 
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2. THE IMPACT OF THE BRICS COUNTRIES’ EMERGENCE ON THEIR 
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE EU 
2.1 ORIGINS AND TRAJECTORIES OF EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE BRICS  
The notion of EU strategic partnerships is and remains an amorphous concept in EU external 
relations. The groundwork for the EU’s strategic partnerships with the BRICS was laid in the various 
agreements and partnerships that emerged since the mid-1990s, with the wording appearing for the 
first time in the context of EU-Russia relations in 1998.64 Cooperation agreements signed between the 
EU and the country in question form the legal basis for the relationships. The EU has a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement with Russia signed in 1994 (which took effect in 1997), that expired in 2007 but 
which has been extended on an annual basis after that. EU-India relations are built on the basis of a 
Cooperation Agreement from 1994, while the EU-China relationship legally is still governed by the 1985 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement. With Brazil the EU has a framework cooperation agreement from 
1992 and with South Africa it maintains a Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement from 1999. 
By the early years of the new millennium, some of the relationships were in clear need of an upgrade, 
made more urgent by the geopolitical climate at the turn of the century.65  
The final push to formalise these relations into ‘strategic partnerships’ came from the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) of 2003. In the ESS, six major countries were recognised as important partners for the EU. 
Amongst the BRICS, the document, drafted by High Representative Javier Solana’s office, emphasised 
the need for closer relations with Russia and urged the EU to develop strategic partnerships also with 
China and India, while no mention was made of Brazil and South Africa.66 Subsequently, strategic 
partnerships were established with China, Russia and India during summits in 2003–04.67 To these were 
added strategic partnerships with Brazil and South Africa concluded in 2007, at summits in May (South 
Africa) and July (Brazil). Currently, the EU already has ten strategic partnerships, including also with 
Canada, Japan, Korea and Mexico.68 
While the background of the EU’s prior relationships with the first batch of BRICS partners differed, a 
common context was the international uproar against the Iraq war and the perceived 
unilateralism of the United States. Especially in the cases of China and Russia, developing stronger 
ties with the EU can be seen as a means to counterbalance US unilateralism. The introduction of the ESS 
contained veiled criticism of US unilateralism:  
The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in 
particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant 
position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today’s complex 
problems on its own.69 
This statement points toward an important initial motivating factor for the BRICS to join these 
partnerships. In all five cases, it is probably safe to conclude that governments saw value in promoting a 
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multipolar vision of the world in which they themselves constituted one of these ‘poles’. By concluding 
strategic partnerships with these countries, the EU was then offering symbolic recognition of 
their importance in the global system, i.e., of their Great Power status. 
However, this also sowed the seeds for later disappointments and disillusionment with the strategic 
partnerships. While most of the BRICS craved recognition of the multipolar nature of international 
relations, EU policy-makers intended to ‘multilaterise multipolarism’. Then, as now, the EU perceived 
itself as a ‘model-power’.70 At the historic moment of 2003 that saw unprecedented rifts in the North 
Atlantic Community, the EU’s catchphrase ‘effective multilateralism’ for a moment appeared to dovetail 
with the need of the BRICS countries for greater international recognition.  
There was then both a push and a pull factor involved. The EU was actively striving for strategic 
partnerships with China, India and Russia, while these countries’ themselves saw it as desirably to 
strengthen ties with the EU, or at least with Europe. It was only at the turn of the millennium that India’s 
potential and importance was fully realized in Brussels and in the EU capitals.71 In this respect, Europe’s 
Asia Strategy of the late 1990s was important in raising India’s profile in Brussels. In the case of South 
Africa, the ‘pull factor’ seems to have been relatively more important than in the other cases, with 
President Mbeki actively seeking stronger ties with the EU.  
Added impetus for closer cooperation came from a mutual desire to achieve concrete progress 
on key issues. Brazil was keen on receiving support for its bid to gain a seat on the UN Security Council, 
while Portugal during its EU presidency actively sought to improve European trade ties with Brazil due 
to the stalled trade negotiations between the EU and Mercosur. China, for its part, was keen on securing 
early market economy status and a lifting of the arms embargo, while the EU was seeking 
improvements in markets access and stronger IPR protection for European companies operating in 
China. Similar push and pull factors played in favour of closer relations with the remaining BRICS. 
No clear definition of the elusive term ‘strategic partnership’ is to be found anywhere in official 
documents. In a 2004 interview for Chinese media, Javier Solana admitted this much.72 It appears that 
the two terms of concept – what is strategic and what is a partnership – were left unclear on purpose. 
Scholars commonly lament this lack of clarity on what the concept signifies,73 which is made even more 
confusing by the fact that some major countries are themselves fond of using the term to denote their 
own relationships with other key countries. Notably, China has expended much rhetorical effort and 
high-level summitry in establishing partnerships with dozens of major countries on all continents, as 
well as with regional groupings, including separately with a number of EU member states.74 Thus, the 
term strategic partnership has continued to lead a somewhat awkward life in EU diplomatic parlance 
and documents. Unsurprisingly, the concept has remained ‘unknown to most people – including EU 
officials’, at least until the September 2010 European Council.75 Indirectly, it can be deduced that 
strategic partnership merely signifies a closer and deeper relationship between the EU and a non-EU 
country.  
The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty seems to have served as a catalyst for a review of these relationships. 
With the appointment of a President of the European Council (Herman van Rompuy), the job of 
representing the EU at the annual partnership summits ceased to be a competence of the rotating EU 
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Presidency. Van Rompuy seized this opportunity by announcing in his first major foreign policy speech 
in February 2010 that ‘we need to review and strengthen our relationship with key partners. I am above 
all thinking about the United States, Canada, Russia, China, Japan, India, and Brazil.’76 Later that year, 
Van Rompuy followed his announcement by calling for an extraordinary European Council meeting on 
16 September 2010 to deal with these partnerships. 
At the European Council meeting of September 2010, the EU’s High Representative Catherine 
Ashton was tasked to ‘evaluate the prospects of relations with all strategic partners, and set out 
in particular our interests and possible leverage to achieve them‘ in coordination with the 
European Commission and the Foreign Affairs Council.77 The European Council also established a 
definitive list of nine strategic partners (to which a tenth was later added) and called for greater internal 
coordination between the EU and the member states in their relationship with these countries. It should 
be noted that in some cases, there is, as yet, not much more than an expressed desire for closer 
partnership. In December 2010, Catherine Ashton presented her first progress report on the EU’s 
strategic partnerships with the US, Russia and China, implicitly suggesting an informal ‘pecking order’ 
amongst these partnerships. 
The first progress report confirmed the focus of the partnerships on promoting the EU’s vision of 
‘effective multilateralism’ and on greater coordination in multilateral forums. The progress report also 
suggested revising these partnerships by identifying common elements, as well as specific priorities 
and objectives for each of the partners. Based on these, linkages and trade-offs between different issues 
areas were meant to be established in order to provide the EU with greater ‘bargaining power’. 
However, Catherine Ashton’s failed attempt to revive the discussion on China’s arms embargo as a 
possible bargaining chip demonstrated the practical difficulties in this regard. The presentation of the 
second progress report on the EU’s relationship with India, Brazil and South Africa at the informal 
foreign affairs Council meeting on 2 September 2011 in Sopot, suffered from a lack of attention, due to 
the Libya and Eurozone crises, with little news emerging on the issue at hand. 
Overall, the review process can be regarded as an attempt to tackle the inconsistency and apparent 
ineffectiveness of the strategic partnerships. So far, however, the review process seems to have led 
to few results. Last year’s annual summits with China and the US are widely regarded as having 
been failures. And with progress reports on the last four partnerships still outstanding, there is 
no clear sign yet on what the outcome of the review will be. Catherine Ashton for her part has stated 
that her motto for the current reflection is: ‘fewer priorities, greater coherence and more results’.78 
Whether this is feasible remains to be seen. 
 
2.2 CURRENT STATE OF EU’S STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE BRICS 
In this section, we examine four areas of the relationships that we deem as particularly crucial: 
institutionalising the relationship, perceived value of the partnership, security relations, as well as 
concrete progress and sticking points. 
Institutionalising the relationship. Although the EU’s strategic partnerships usually contain common 
institutional features, e.g. annual summits and joint action plans that outline a medium-term vision for 
the relationship, these partnerships are not alike. In some instances they contain notable 
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differences and they can be seen as ‘neither identical nor equal’79 (see Table 8 for a systematic 
comparison of the partnerships). This is particularly true for the five BRICS countries. For example, the 
EU and China do not have an overall Joint Action Plan (JAP) for their strategic partnership, only a very 
specific JAP for the EU-China Year of Youth 2011. In contrast, there are no less than seven JAPs in EU-
Russia relations. Also, the EU conducts annual summits with a broader set of actors, beyond its strategic 
partners. 
Overall, the EU-Russia relationship appears to contain the most ‘special arrangements’: summits are 
held biannually, instead of annually; instead of one overall JAP for the partnership, the relationship is 
structured into four ‘common spaces’ with their own road maps (JAPs); Russia was the first to conclude 
a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, although that agreement has now expired and is extended 
on an annual basis; finally, Russia, unlike the others, does not receive EU development aid. 
If institutionalisation of the relationship is one way to gauge its strength, then the picture is 
rather mixed. The EU and China have, for example, had drawn-out negotiations on a Political and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that would take the place of the old Trade Agreement from 1985. While 
the EU’s demand for a standard ‘democracy and human rights’ clause is unpalatable to China, market-
related issues have been just as tricky. The Russian PCA has been in limbo since 2007 when it expired. 
The PCA has been extended annually, pending Russian WTO entry. A major impediment to closer EU-
Brazil relations has been the stalled EU-Mercosur negotiations. Concluding the EU-Mercosur FTA would 
open up the prospect for enhanced economic cooperation and, through that, a deepening of EU-Brazil 
relations at all levels. 
Intriguingly, it appears that the most recent of the strategic partnerships with the BRICS (South 
Africa) is also the most institutionalised one. Unlike the others, EU-South Africa are already long in 
the process of the implementing a free trade agreement; the two sides maintain a regular security 
dialogue at the COPS-level (Political and Security Committee); South Africa has participated in an EU-led 
peacekeeping operation (Operation Artemis) and South Africa is also by far the biggest recipient of 
development aid. 
The perceived value of partnership. Relative power has shifted to quite an extraordinary extent over the 
past decade. The BRICS countries initially saw it as desirable to strive for the EU’s recognition of their 
status as ‘poles’ in a multipolar world. A few years back, EU symbolic recognition clearly still mattered. 
Now it is increasingly the case that BRICS countries are reluctant to recognise the EU as ‘a player’ 
or ‘stakeholder’ at all on many issues. Even worse, if the EU’s original idea was to coax the BRICS 
countries into its own framework of effective multilateralism, it has increasingly been forced to 
play ball with the game-rules preferred by the BRICS, taken straight from the sovereignty 
playbook.80 
It appears that expectations towards the strategic partnership have played an important role in how the 
BRICS countries now view these partnerships. While India, for example, seemed to adopt a rather 
cavalier attitude toward the whole partnership from the start,81 Indian views of EU-India relations have 
become more positive of late. EU-China relations have seen the opposite trajectory. While there were 
high hopes for stronger relations in the beginning of the strategic partnership, EU-China relations have 
progressively worsened ever since. Recently, it has even been argued that China no longer even wants a 
strategic partnership with Europe.82 EU-Russia relations have followed a somewhat similar trajectory. In 
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any case, Russia considers that its relationship with the EU in many ways is different from the others, 
given its geographical proximity, strong historical ties to Europe and its character as a former 
superpower rather than an emerging power. South Africa has been keener on the partnership with the 
EU. South Africa is also the BRICS that is most clearly a middle-ranking power, rather than a major 
power. 
Security relations. Security is one area where EU-BRICS cooperation is particularly thin. For example, of 
the 24 agreements between the EU and the BRICS countries between 2003 and 2010, only three are 
related to security.83 For all the rhetoric of strategic partnerships, there is very little that is strategic 
about these relationships in the traditional sense. While security issues are occasionally discussed 
between the EU and the BRICS, the dialogue tends to be on a general level (regional security, terrorism 
etc), with little concrete resulting from it, let alone joint actions.84 So far, only South Africa and Russia 
have had limited participation in EU peacekeeping missions, both in Africa. This is then a far cry from the 
relationship between the EU and the US/NATO, with NATO de facto often complementing the EU 
missions or the EU taking over some of the NATO operations (as has been the case in the Balkans).  
The limits to closer security cooperation between the EU and the BRICS have been perhaps most 
evident in the case of China. The short-lived ‘honeymoon’ enjoyed by the EU and China in 2003–04 
coincided with a strong push by some of the bigger member states for lifting the arms embargo on 
China. After this endeavour was torpedoed by strong opposition from the United States and Japan,85 
EU-China relations have been on a deteriorating track. On the other hand, the BRICS, in particular China, 
Russia and India do not even regard the EU as a real security actor outside of Europe. They are willing to 
discuss specific areas of broader security, such as terrorism with appropriate officials in the EU (India, for 
example, has been active in this respect). But when it comes to matters of hard security, the BRICS 
countries are, with the exception of South Africa, quite happy to keep the EU out of their respective 
spheres of influence.  
Concrete progress and sticking points. A considerable number of specific agreements have been agreed 
upon between the EU and the BRICS countries.86 For example, with India the EU has a joint work 
programme on climate change, and on clean development and energy, and the two sides are in 
negotiation on a FTA. With Brazil, the EU has concluded agreements on aviation safety and open skies, 
in addition to which the Euratom and Brazil cooperate in the field of fusion energy research. A visa 
waiver program is also in place. With South Africa one could mention the COST (Cooperation in Science 
and Technology) partnership, ERASMUS Mundus, as well as a Trade Development and Cooperation 
Agreement Support Facility. Admittedly, these agreements would most likely have come about also 
without the rhetorical strategic partnership. 
Despite these concrete achievements, in the case of the EU’s strategic partnerships with the 
BRICS, there have been many failures and lost opportunities to ‘operationalise‘ the strategic 
partnerships. For various reasons, the EU has not been able to deliver what its partners have most 
cared about. A case in point is the issue of permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
membership. While several individual EU member states have supported the inclusion of India, Brazil 
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and South Africa in the UNSC,87 other EU member states – most notably Italy – has been against it, and 
Germany, Russia and Canada also have voiced reservations on UNSC enlargement.88  
In many cases, the partnership has become bogged down in a deadlock on contentious issues (see 
Table 8). The BRICS countries often let it be known that EU intransigence on granting them ‘status 
victories’ is a clear signal that the EU is not serious about wanting a true strategic partnership. For 
example, the Chinese Premier was reportedly incensed of the lack of progress on the arms embargo 
and market economy status (MES) issues in the 2010 EU-China summit to the point where the whole 
summit almost ended in a disaster due to this. Recently, with growing calls for China to buy bonds and 
invest in troubled European countries, the Chinese Premier bluntly stated that China will consider this 
only after the EU shows its sincerity by granting Market Economy Status ahead of 2016, when China will 
get it anyway, as part of the WTO deal.89  Similarly, the EU-Brazil relationship has become bogged down 
due to the EU’s deadlocked trade negotiations with Mercosur. 
 
2.3 NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE BRICS 
‘Until now, we have strategic partners, now we also need a strategy’ 
(Herman van Rompuy, 14 September 2010)90 
There now is a broad consensus amongst both policy-makers and the academic community that 
the unfocused and seemingly arbitrary way in which the EU engages with its strategic partners is 
in need of an overhaul. While there is some debate on whether the lack of conceptual clarity of these 
partnerships is actually an underlying strength or a weakness of the concept, most would agree that 
their effectiveness as a tool for EU external action remains questionable. At a bilateral level, the list of 
concrete achievements of these partnerships remains notably low. More worryingly even is the fact that 
at the multilateral level, these partnerships seem to have failed to promote the EU’s vision of 
international affairs. 
In Copenhagen, the BASIC countries banded together with the US to leave the EU out in the cold in the 
climate change talks. In 2010, significantly, six out of the nine ‘strategic partners’ of the EU voted against 
upgrading the EU’s status in the UN General Assembly. And at the IMF, the BRICS have blocked a 
European proposal on capital controls. Moreover, beyond these anecdotal examples, there is little to 
suggest that the strategic partnerships have promoted a shared understanding of international 
affairs, greater appreciation of the EU, or even a common vision for global governance with the 
BRICS countries, as was pointed out in the first part of this report. 
In short, the EU partnerships reflect a political reality where the EU has not succeeded in establishing 
true strategic partnerships with the BRICS countries and where the EU itself is also perceived as ‘the 
weak end of the strategic partnerships’.91 Even worse, some of the so-called strategic partners have 
caused divisions between EU member states rather than contributing to intensified cooperation in 
order to tackle global issues.92  
                                                               
87 In 2008, France and the UK issued a joint declaration in support for the inclusion of Germany, India, Japan and Brazil as 
permanent members as well as a permanent representation for the African continent. 
88 Cf. Keukeleire and Bruyninckx, 2011: 398. 
89 Financial Times, 14.9.2011. 
90 European Council, 2010. 
91 Renard and Hooijmaaijers, 2011: 6. 
92 See e.g. Fox and Godement, 2009; Leonard and Popescu, 2007. 
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Realising the shortcomings of the strategic partnerships, both as a concept and as a tool for EU external 
action, in September 2010 the European Council asked EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton to 
‘evaluate the prospects of relations with all strategic partners, and set out in particular our interests and 
possible leverage to achieve them’.93 With two progress reports having been issued by the High 
Representative in 2010/2011 and a third one outstanding, the time has now come to think about the 
future architecture of these relationships. 
Below, we identify four potential options for the EU to further develop the strategic partnerships 
as a policy tool. These derive from the assumption that there are two potential ways for the EU to 
further develop these partnerships. First, the EU can either decide to further deepen its engagement 
with a core group of major powers amongst its already existing strategic partners, or broaden the 
strategic partnership concept to engage a much wider set of middling powers.94 Second, the EU can 
choose to start using these partnerships in order to address more narrowly defined bilateral issues of 
common concern (and with that drop its focus on ‘effective multilateralism’), or it can attempt to focus 
these partnerships on addressing global governance issues and promoting its vision of ‘effective 
multilateralism.’ 
Given these two potential ways of developing the strategic partnerships, the options available to the EU 
seem to derive from a combination of a ‘deepening-widening’ continuum and an ‘interests-values’ 
continuum. Of course, the resulting options represent ‘ideal types’, which are nevertheless indicative of 
the different directions in which the EU can develop the strategic partnership concept in the 
foreseeable future. Ultimately, of course, the strategic partnerships are jointly negotiated between the 
EU and its partners and will continue to contain an element of ad-hocism so that a ‘pick-and-choose’ 
outcome remains the most likely for the time being. However, framing the EU’s options in these broad 
categories might encourage a greater strategic thinking about the broader means and ends the EU 
pursues with these partnerships in the first place. 
 
Figure 2: Simplified Matrix of EU Options 
 
 
Fusing would indicate that the EU should develop deeper relations with a core group of ‘major powers’ 
on the basis of their geo-strategic importance and the EU’s economic and political dependence on 
                                                               
93 European Council Conclusions, 2010. 
94 Gratius, 2011. 
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these countries. Most likely that would mean creating a ‘special relationship’ with some of the BRICS 
(most likely China and Russia) on a more strategic and political level. Eventually, this kind of relationship 
might come to reflect on the EU’s current relationship with the United States, as these countries further 
gain in importance and as the EU’s dependence on these countries increases. Given the EU’s evident 
inability to convince these countries of the benefits of its vision of ‘effective multilateralism’, this would 
mean that the EU would have to accept the reality of a more multipolar world, by fusing its vision of 
international affairs with their views of the international system. Fusing would most likely involve a 
trade-off on such issues as the Chinese arms embargo or Russia’s right to intervene in its 
neighbourhood in order for the EU to gain reassurances on issues of its own interests (energy, 
international finance, etc). Doing so, of course, might risk damaging relations with some of its 
established partners, like the USA. 
Focusing would also indicate that the EU should develop deeper relations with a core group of major 
powers, but this deepening would be based on a shared vision of international affairs and values, rather 
than the EU’s ‘geo-strategic’ interests. This could imply engaging in a closer relationship with the IBSA 
countries, which at times tend to have a different view of international affairs than China and Russia. 
Like the EU, these countries are also democracies. This option would likely have to involve 
acknowledging IBSA countries as regional powers and giving in on a number of trade-related issues 
that are amongst their primary concerns. The EU might also have something to offer to these countries 
on a strategic level, given that they play in a very different league than Russia and China. In a best case 
scenario, a deepening of relations with some of these would allow for a competitive dynamic, where 
other countries would like to emulate the new status and advantages the EU bestows on the IBSA 
countries. 
Diffusing would indicate a widening of the strategic partnerships to new middling powers such as 
Indonesia, Turkey, Nigeria, Argentina, Egypt and Pakistan that are becoming important regional actors 
and would reflect the EU’s adoption of a strategic partnership with South Korea. The focus in this case 
would be mostly on bilateral interests and would not seek to impose the EU’s values and global vision 
on these actors. The EU’s engagement in this case would be partly aimed at checking the growing 
influence of the BRICS with these new players and would build on the fact that in some cases these new 
players are in direct competition with the BRICS for regional influence and status (Pakistan-India, Brazil-
Argentina, etc). This could be potentially damaging for relations with some of the BRICS, who would see 
the relative value of their strategic partnerships drop even further. It would also further dilute the 
concept of strategic partnerships and risks causing a ‘death by summits’ scenario for an already 
overloaded EU bureaucracy. 
Diluting would, similar to broadening, indicate a widening of strategic partnerships to a new group of 
key countries. However, instead of choosing these countries on the basis of their future political and 
economic potential and in order to check the growing regional reach of the BRICS, this would be done 
on the basis of their congruence with Europe’s vision of ‘effective multilateralism’ and would be based 
on promoting European ideas on governance and human rights. Moreover, these new strategic 
partnerships would mainly address global governance issues, rather than issues of bilateral concern. 
This could be done through, for example, more regular meetings on climate change issues with like-
minded countries or coordination meetings before G20 summits. The primary aim would be to dilute 
the influence of the BRICS on global governance by mimicking their proliferation of new regional, 
multilateral and bilateral forums. 
As has been pointed out, these categories are of course ideal types. Most likely, ‘ad-hocism’ will 
continue to be the main trend determining the way these partnerships develop. However, for the EU to 
start developing a grand strategy of how to employ these partnerships, thinking along the lines 
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of these different categories pointed out in the above might be useful. Above all, they demonstrate 
the real trade-offs of choosing one option over another. By binding itself closer to the BRICS with an 
emphasis on Russia and China, the EU’s multilateral vision is likely to be diluted. By choosing to 
emphasise its global vision and values and focusing on a different group of actors, maintaining close 
relations with some of the BRICS might be complicated etc. Realising these trade-offs is a necessary 
element of developing a new strategy and understanding as the EU seeks to further develop its 
strategic partnerships. 
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3. THE CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: BEYOND 
EUROPEAN MYOPIA 
This study on the EU foreign policy towards the BRICS argues that the BRICS countries do not form a 
bloc and should thus not be approached by the EU as a coherent bloc, but rather as an 
increasingly dense and influential network which, together with other overlapping multilateral 
settings, has a growing impact on international political and economic governance. The impact of 
the BRICS countries on the EU can only be correctly understood if it is seen as part of a wider shift in 
the international balance of power, both politically and economically.  
This leads to a first major recommendation for the EU, which psychologically may also be the most 
difficult: the European population and European politicians have to adapt to a world order in which 
Western countries do not systematically dominate anymore, but which is characterized by an 
‘irresistible shift of global power to the East’ and to the South.95 This shift may be further accelerated if 
the Europeans prove to be unable to tackle their financial crisis. In this context, it is not in itself a 
problem that the EU has not developed a coherent ‘BRICS policy’. More problematic is that the EU has 
no a policy to deal with the changing balance of power in the 21st century – a phenomenon in which 
the rise of the BRICS has to be situated.  
This shift in the balance of power also has an impact on what the EU considers of crucial importance: 
‘effective multilateralism’. It may be useful to recognize that the BRICS countries and the other Asian or 
Southern countries have made a ‘choice for multilateralism’ too – just like the Europeans – but that it is 
a choice for multilateralism based on different principles with regard to both contents and 
approach. In terms of content, they prioritise economic growth and development, which can be linked 
to the reluctance of BRICS countries to let economic development be restricted by concerns in other 
policy domains that the Europeans consider important, such as environment or the EU’s interpretation 
of human rights. In terms of approach, they have a preference for pure intergovernmentalism in which 
national sovereignty is fully respected, with decision-making by consensus, absence of treaty 
obligations and voluntary commitments. This is opposed to the European preference for legally binding 
commitments and powerful international organisations and regimes. This much becomes clear in the 
G20 in which the BRICS countries have had their biggest political relevance. Seen from the BRICS 
countries’ vantage point, the function of the G20 is somewhat akin to the 19th century Concert of 
Europe, albeit on a global scale. It stresses a form of international power that places sovereign Great 
Powers at the centre of a power system that is much less institutionalised, less binding, and more ad 
hoc than what EU officials have in mind when talking of effective multilateralism.  
This leads to the following policy recommendation: the EU can continue to actively promote its own 
view of effective multilateralism, but should not take for granted that its preference for binding 
commitments and institutionalised regimes will be shared by other actors. This implies that if the 
EU becomes aware that it is in danger of becoming marginalised in a specific negotiation context, it has 
to accept early enough that the discussions will be based on a different ‘multilateralism paradigm’ than 
the one preferred by the Europeans and that it has to pursue its interests and seek allies within this new 
context. The experience of the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit indicated that the EU should 
follow much more attentively the general negotiation dynamics and timely adapt its approach 
accordingly. 
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Negotiations within the G20 and the Copenhagen Summit also indicate that on issues of global 
governance it is increasingly hard to achieve results unless the BRICS countries or at least some of them 
are on board. In view of the importance of global governance issues for the EU, this also implies that the 
EU has to engage more actively with the BRICS countries and other emerging states. In the climate 
change negotiations and in G20 negotiations (e.g. the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, the 
regulation of cross-border capital flows, and improving the international reserve currency system) a 
certain coordination of strategies among the BRICS countries can indeed be discerned from their action. 
Even if they are not always acting as a coherent bloc, they have an increasing impact, either in 
agenda setting or in shifting the terms of the debate, or because they manage to block proposals 
formulated by the EU or the West.  
A mixed assessment also follows from an analysis of the voting behaviour of the BRICS countries in the 
United Nations. In the UN General Assembly, the BRICS countries cast identical votes in 56–63% of 
the resolutions voted upon. Significantly, they did not vote as a bloc on a considerable 
percentage of the resolutions. Other variations of the BRICS format show higher scores in terms of 
voting cohesion, with the highest in rank being the IBSA format. If the EU is seeking support within the 
group of emerging powers, it may find a more coherent set of actors in the ‘India – Brazil – South Africa’ 
partnership than in the BRICS setting in general. Initially, this also looks more attractive to the EU, as 
these are democratic countries, perceived as sharing more clearly the EU’s values and objectives. 
However, a closer look at the various foreign policy issues demonstrates that it is not self-evident to 
engage more actively with the IBSA countries, although the positions of particularly South Africa and 
Brazil are closer to the EU than those of China and Russia. Yet, even South Africa, Brazil and India 
often consider the values ‘respect for national sovereignty’ and ‘non-intervention’ more 
important than what the EU considers as core values of its foreign policy: human rights and 
democracy.  
In this context, it does not help the EU’s position that there clearly is a gap between the EU’s self-
perception as a positive normative power and the way it is perceived by third countries. This is also 
reflected in the findings of the PEW Global Attitudes Survey, which pointed to a decline of the overall 
image of the EU in 2011, with less than half of the people who took part in the opinion poll in 
Brazil, China and India being favourable towards the EU. This leads to another recommendation: 
the EU has to do major efforts to stop the decline of Europe’s image in the world. And this will not be 
possible by merely launching a ‘public diplomacy’ campaign in which the EU and the EP emphasizes its 
own values, which may even have the opposite effect. Strengthening the EU’s image in the world will 
require sustainable efforts to show to the elites and the population in the BRICS countries that the EU 
can be a relevant and useful power in solving issues of mutual concern. 
The previous analysis also points to one of the reasons why the EU’s ‘strategic partnership’ with the 
individual BRICS countries has been a failure. In general, these strategic partnerships did not contribute 
to substantially upgrading the relations with the increasingly important BRICS countries. Neither did 
they help to prepare the EU to the shifting balance of power to the South and the Asian-Pacific region. 
The EU has never managed to define what its ‘strategic interests’ are, why these partnerships are 
strategic, and what could be expected from such a partnership. Indeed, from the vantage point of many 
BRICS countries, it still appears that the only true strategic partnership of the EU is the North Atlantic 
partnership with the United States. However, the predominant Atlantic strategic partnership of the 
20th century will not be sufficient for the EU to pursue its interests in the new 21st century context. 
The European Council of September 2010 called for an evaluation of relations with the strategic 
partners. However, for the moment ambiguity remains about the nature of these partnerships and the 
real strategic priorities and choices of the EU. This study proposes four theoretical options to develop 
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a new architecture for the EU’s strategic partnerships with the BRICS countries and further develop 
the concept of strategic partnerships as a policy tool. These options centre around the concepts 
‘fusing’, aimed mainly at Russia and China; ‘focusing’, aimed at the IBSA countries that at least on 
some issues are closer to the EU’s positions; ‘diffusing’, aimed at widening the strategic 
partnerships to even more regional powers on the basis of bilateral interest; and ‘diluting’, aimed 
at widening them based on a shared view on effective multilateralism.  
The resulting options represent ‘ideal types’. As the strategic partnerships are jointly negotiated 
between the EU and its partners, they will continue to contain an element of ad-hocism. However, 
framing the EU’s options through these categories might encourage more strategic thinking about the 
broader means and ends the EU pursues with the partnerships. It will force the EU to think carefully 
about the diplomatic, economic and other trade-offs and implications of choosing a particular option 
(or combination of options), or alternatively deciding to continue the current ad-hoc approach. In 
practice, each option has advantages, but also serious disadvantages – not least with regard to Europe’s 
traditional main strategic partner, the US. 
Whatever option the EU would like to chose, the EU will have to invest much more time and energy in 
negotiations and dialogues with its external partners, instead of focusing mainly on internal 
discussions and turf battles or on just repeating the same European messages without entering 
into a real interaction. This may also become one of the tasks of the European Parliament, that is, to 
control whether the High Representative, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Union 
Delegations as well as its own Standing Committees and Interparliamentary Delegations to third 
countries and regions do spend sufficient time and energy in pursuing European interests through an 
intensive dialogue with third countries and groups of countries. 
It is in the interest of the EU to convince the emerging new powers and multilateral frameworks that the 
EU remains a relevant power with which they share common interests, and that it understands the 
global shift of power. If the EU wants to strengthen its ties with the BRICS countries, it has to pay 
more attention to their views, interests and approaches, and to some extent take these into 
account when formulating positions. Naturally, this only works as an implicit trade-off, with the 
BRICS country in turn taking on some of the EU’s positions and interests. This is also important in 
order to identify points of leverage and trade-offs, which can be essential to gain their support for EU 
objectives. In conclusion, the EU will have to be aware that by engaging in such trade-offs, it risks 
greater friction with some of its traditional allies, like the US. It would also imply diluting its more 
normative goals in international affairs. 
What the dialogue between the EU and the individual BRICS countries should lead to is the 
identification of a limited number of strategic objectives which will be at the heart of their cooperation 
(either bilateral or in smaller settings such as the IBSA framework) and which will be translated into a 
concrete action plan. These can be strategic objectives that are genuinely shared by both the EU and 
the BRICS country. However, they can also be strategic objectives which are mainly (or only) important 
for either the EU or its BRICS partner, but with regard to which the EU and its BRIC partner accept the 
commitment to actively support each other in the pursuit of this strategic goal. The end result may be 
that the EU will have less general ‘strategic partnerships’ and less ‘laundry list’ like action plans, but will 
have entered in a concrete strategic partnership with one or more of its BRICS partners in order to 
realize concrete strategic goals. 
While addressing these issues will be much more difficult – due to the differences between the EU and 
the BRICS countries – the EU should start by strengthening its ability to engage the BRICS 
countries on global governance issues and to conduct multilateral problem solving. In this regard, 
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there are a few practical steps that it could consider undertaking. To start with, it should upgrade its 
Delegations in these countries, especially with staff working on crisis management and other experts on 
global governance related issues (climate change, international finance etc) in order to engage in 
deeper, more focused regular dialogue. It may also want to streamline its dialogue on security issues 
and consider the exchange of liaison officers in certain areas in order to increase common 
understanding. This also requires that the staff in the Delegation to the various BRICS countries and in 
the relevant desks in the EEAS have an in-depth knowledge of and experience in these countries and 
speak the local languages. At the same time, the EU needs to be realistic about its own limitations. 
As has been pointed out before, ‘strategic partnerships require unity of purpose, focus, sometimes hard 
bargaining, a flexible negotiating posture and always political authority. It is fair to say that today’s 
pivotal countries, whether established or rising powers, question whether the EU is endowed with these 
attributes, except on some trade issues.’96  
It is clear that this is a much more complicated and daunting task than in the preceding context when 
the EU only had to take into account one or two powers (the US and sometimes Russia). It may force the 
EU to make some difficult choices and to face some genuine incompatibilities between the strategic 
interests of the EU and the BRICS countries, as well as between the strategic interests of some of the EU 
member states. However, it can also lead to new themes of strategic cooperation that are hitherto 
unexplored. In an increasingly multipolar and interconnected world, the EU may have to pursue its 
interests by developing a network of relations with new partners alongside its current alliance with the 
United States. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
ADB  Asian Development Bank 
APEC  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASEAN+3 Association of Southeast Asian Nations + China, Japan and Korea 
BASIC  Brazil, South Africa, India and China 
BRIC  Brazil, Russia, India and China   
BRICS  Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States 
COP  16th edition of Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention  
on Climate Change 
COPS  Political and Security Committee 
COST  Cooperation in Science and Technology 
EAS  East Asia Summit 
ECB  European Central Bank 
ENP  European Neighbourhood Policy 
ESS  European Security Strategy 
EU  European Union 
FTA  Free Trade Agreement 
G7  The Group of Seven 
G8  The Group of Eight 
G20  The Group of Twenty 
G77  The Group of Seventy-Seven 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
HRC  Human Rights Council 
IBSA  India, Brazil, South Africa 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IPR  Intellectual Property Rights 
JAP  Joint Action Plan 
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market  
MES  Market Economy Status 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NPT  Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
PCA  Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
RIC  Russia, India and China 
SAARC  South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation 
SCO  Shanghai Co-operation Organization 
SDR  Special Drawing Rights 
UN  United Nations 
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
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APPENDIX 
Table 8:  Comparing the EU’s strategic partnerships with the BRICS countries 
 Russia China India Brazil South Africa 
Legal basis for 
relations (signed 
in) 
Partnership and 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
(1994) a 
Trade and 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
(1985) 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
(1994) 
Framework 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
(1992) 
Trade and 
Development 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
(1999) 
Partnership 
launched in 
2003 2003 2004 2007 2007 
Annual summits 
started 
1998 b 1998 2000 2007 2008 
Joint action plan 
for the strategic 
partnership  
yes c no 
 
yes yes yes 
Participation in 
EU 
peacekeeping 
operations 
EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA 
- - - Operation 
Artemis 
Human rights 
dialogues  
consultations structured 
dialogue 
local dialogue local dialogue local dialogue 
Free trade 
agreement 
no no under 
negotiation 
under 
negotiation (EU-
Mercosur) 
progressively 
implemented 
(TDCA) 
EU aid (2007–10 
period) 
- € 128 mn € 260 mn € 61 mn € 560 mn 
Biggest sticking 
points for the 
BRICS country 
energy security, 
visa freedom 
arms embargo, 
market 
economy status 
FTA trade barriers on 
commodities 
(especially 
agricultural 
subsidies) 
Economic 
Partnership 
Agreement, EU 
sanctions on 
Zimbabwe 
Biggest sticking 
points for the EU 
good 
governance and 
corruption in 
Russia, energy 
security, 
‘neighbourhood
’ stability 
market access, 
IPR issues 
political and 
security 
cooperation 
(e.g. maritime 
security and 
peacekeeping) 
trade barriers on 
consumer goods 
and investment 
visa facilitation 
Notes: a. The PCA expired in 2007 and is now being extended on an annual basis. b. With Russia, summits are held biannually. c. 
EU-Russia cooperation is divided into four ‘spaces’, each with its own ‘road map’ (action plan). 
Sources: European Commission website (main source), EU External Action report 2010, especially p. 21. 
The EU Foreign Policy towards the BRICS and other Emerging powers: objectives and strategies 
38 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ADB. ‘Reshaping Global Economic Governance and the Role of Asia in the Group of Twenty (G20)’. 
Manila: Asian Development Bank, April 2011. Available at: 
<www.g20.org/Documents/2005_statement_on_reforming_bwis.pdf>. 
 
Archik, K. et al. ‘European Union’s arms embargo on China: Implications and options for U.S.  policy.’ CRS 
Report for Congress. (2006) Available at <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32870.pdf>. 
 
Arms Control Association website. Available at  
<http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat>. 
 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation website. Available at <http://www.apec.org/>. 
 
BRIC Summit Joint Statement April 2010 available at <http://www.cfr.org/brazil/bric-summit-joint-
statement-april-2010/p21927>. 
 
BRICS Summit 2011 Joint Declaration, available at http://www.pravasitoday.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/04/BRICS-SUMMIT-2011-JOINT-DECLARATION1.pdf 
 
Cameron, F. (2011). ‘The EU and the BRICs’. DSEU Policy Paper 3. Available on http://dseu.lboro.ac.uk/ 
 
Commission of the European Communities (2003). Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament. ‘The European Union and the United Nations: the choice of 
multilateralism’, Brussels, 10.9.2003, COM(2003) 526 final. 
 
Drieskens, E. (Forthcoming, in print). ‘Measuring regional actorness at the UN Security Council: the EU as 
a paragon of complexity’.  In: Baert, F. et al. (eds.) ‘The United Nations and the Regions’. Third World 
Report on Regional Integration. New York: Springer. 
 
Drieskens, E. and Bouchard, C. ‘Researching the European Union at the United Nations in New York: 
Current Trends and Future Agendas’ (Forthcoming, 2012). In: Knud Erik Jorgensen and Katie Verlin 
Laatikainen (eds.). Handbook on Europe and Multilateral Institutions. London: Routledge. 
 
European External Action Service country page Brazil. Available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/brazil/index_en.htm> 
European External Action Service country page China. Available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/china/index_en.htm> 
European External Action Service country page India. Available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/india/index_en.htm> 
The EU Foreign Policy towards the BRICS and other Emerging powers: objectives and strategies 
 39
European External Action Service country page Russia. Available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/index_en.htm> 
European External Action Service country page South Africa. Available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/south_africa/index_en.htm> 
European Commission, DG Trade, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/>. 
 
European Council (2010). Press release president of the European Council 14 September 2010. Available 
at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/116494.pdf>  
EU External Action report ‘Human Rights and Democracy in the World’. Report on EU action July 2008 to 
December 2009. Brussels. (2010). 
European Security Strategy. ‘A secure Europe in a better world,’ European Council: Brussels, 12 
December 2003 
 
Financial Times, ‘When sets preconditions to help Europe.’ 14.9.2011. 
 
Fioramonti, L. and Lucarelli, S. ‘Conclusion: self-representations and external perceptions – can the EU 
bridge the gap?’ In: Fioramonti, L. & Poletti, A. Eds., External Perceptions of the European union as a 
Global Actor (2010). (pp. 218-225). London: Routledge. 
 
Fioramonti, L. and Poletti, A. ‘Facing the Giant: Southern perspectives on the European Union’, Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 29 (1), (2008). pp. 167-180. 
 
Fox, J. and Godement, F. ‘A Power Audit of EU-China Relations’. London: European Council on Foreign 
Relations. (2009). 
 
G20 ‘The G20 Seoul summit leaders’ declaration’, 11-12 November 2010 
 
G20 communiqué, Berlin, 15–16 December 1999. Available at: 
<www.g20.org/Documents/1999_germany.pdf>. 
 
‘The G-20 Statement on Reforming the Bretton Woods Institutions’, 2005, Xianghe, PRC. Available at: 
<www.g20.org/Documents/2005_statement_on_reforming_bwis.pdf>. 
 
G24. Communiqué, Washington, 14 April 2011. 
 
Gallagher, K. P.  ‘The IMF, capital controls and developing countries,’ Economic and Political Weekly 46 
(19): 12–16. (2011). 
 
Policy Department DG External Policies 
 40
Godement, F. and Parello-Plesner, J. ‘The scramble for Europe,’ European Council on Foreign Relations. 
ECFR 37. (2011). 
 
Gowan, R. and Brantner, F. ‘The EU and Human Rights at the UN: 2010 review’. London: European 
Council on Foreign Relations. (2010). 
 
Gratius, S. ‘The EU and the ‘special ten’: Deepening or widening the strategic partnerships,’ Madrid: 
FRIDE. (2011). 
 
Grevi, G. ‘Making EU strategic partnerships effective,’ Madrid: FRIDE. (2010). 
 
Grevi, G. and de Vasconcelos, A. (eds.) ‘Partnership for effective multilateralism: EU relations with Brazil, 
China, India and Russia’. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies. (2008). 
 
Hallding, K. et al ‘Together Alone? The BASIC Countries and the Climate Change Conundrum,’ Nordic 
Council of Ministers Report, October 2011.  
Holslag, J. ‘Europe’s normative disconnect with the emerging powers,’ BICCS Asia Paper Vol. 5 (4): 1–21. 
(2010). 
Hurrell, A. (2006), 'Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Grea Powers?', 
International Affairs 82/1: 1-19. 
IMF ‘Recent Experiences in Managing Capital Inflows: Cross-Cutting Themes and Possible Policy 
Framework’. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. (2011). 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (2011). ‘The Military Balance 2011, annual assessment of the 
military capabilities and defence economics’. London: Routledge. 
 
Jain, R. ‘Engaging the European Superpower: India and the European Union,’ in Bart  
Gaens et al. (eds) The Role of the European Union in Asia. China and India as Strategic Partners. 
Farnham: Ashgate, (2009). pp. 173–188. 
Javier Solana interview with Xinhua News Agency and China Youth Daily, 2004, 
<consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/sghr_int/79740.pdf> 
Jokela, J. ‘The European Union as an international actor: Europeanization and institutional changes in 
light of the EU’s Asia policies,’ in Bart Gaens et al. (eds) The Role of the European Union in Asia. China 
and India as Strategic Partners. Farnham: Ashgate, (2009) pp. 37–54. 
Jokela, J. ‘The G-20: A pathway to effective multilateralism?,’ Chaillot Paper no. 125, Paris: The European 
Union Institute of Security Studies. (2011). 
Kapila, S. ‘European Union—India Strategic Partnership reviewed,’ Paper no. 2661, South Asia Analysis 
Group. (2008). Available at: <www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers27%5Cpaper2661.html>.  
The EU Foreign Policy towards the BRICS and other Emerging powers: objectives and strategies 
 41
Keukeleire, S. and Bruyninckx, H. ‘The European Union, the BRICs and the emerging new  world order’. 
In: Hill, C. & Smith, M. Eds., International Relations and the European Union 2nd Edition. (2011). (pp. 380-
403) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Keukeleire, S. and MacNaughtan, J. The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. (2008) 
Kissack, R. ‘European Union Member States coordination in the United 
Nations system: towards a methodology for analysis’. London: London School of 
Economics. (2007). 
 
Kumar, R. ‘India as a Foreign Policy Actor – Normative Redux’, in Tocci, N. (ed.), Who is a Normative 
Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and its Global Partners (Brussels: CEPS). (2008). 
 
Laatikainen, K. and Smith, K. Eds. ‘The European Union at the United Nations, Intersecting 
Multilateralisms’. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (2006) 
Leonard, M. and Popescu N. ‘A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations’. London: European Council on 
Foreign Relations. (2007). 
Lucarelli, S. ‘The European Union in the Eyes of Others: Towards Filling a Gap in the Literature’, European 
Foreign Affairs Review (2007)., Vol. 12 (3), pp. 249-271.  
Luif, P. ‘EU cohesion in the UN General Assembly’. Paris: EU Institute 
for Security Studies. Occasional Paper No. 49. (2003). 
Mahbubani, K., The New Asian Hemisphere. The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East. New York: 
Public Affairs (2008). 
Mahbubani, K., ‘Europe’s Errors’, Time, 8 March (2010). 
Mahbubani, K., ‘The lessons that smug Europe should learn from Asia’, Europe’s World, Summer (2011), 
pp. 12-14. 
Mattlin, M. ‘Thinking clearly on political strategy: The formulation of a common EU policy toward China,’ 
in Bart Gaens et al. (eds) The Role of the European Union in Asia. China and India as Strategic Partners. 
Farnham: Ashgate, (2009).  pp. 95–120. 
Olivier, G and Fioramonti, L. ‘The emerging ‘global south’: The EU in the eyes of India, Brazil and South 
Africa’. In External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor, edited by Lucarelli, S and 
Fioramonti, L. London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. (2010). 
O’Neill, J. Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No. 66: ‘The World Needs Better Economic BRICs’. 
(2001). 
 
PEW Research Center China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower 23-Nation Pew Global Attitudes 
Survey. Available at <http://www.pewglobal.org/>.  
President of Russia ‘Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders’, Yekaterinburg, June 16, available at 
<http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/06/217963.shtml>.(2009b), 
Policy Department DG External Policies 
 42
Progress Report for the European Council on Strategic Partners 16-17 December 2010. Available at: 
<http://www.europolitique.info/pdf/gratuit_fr/285183-fr.pdf> 
Renard, T. ‘The treachery of strategies: A call for for true EU strategic partnerships,’ (2011a). Egmont 
Paper 45, <www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep45.pdf>. 
Renard, T. ‘EU foreign ministers should look to grand strategy,’ EUObserver, 30 August. (2011b). 
Renard, T. and Hooijmaaijers, B. ‘Assessing the EU’s Strategic Partnerships in the UN system’. Egmont 
Security Policy Brief 45. (2011). Available at: <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/11/sec-gov/SPB24-
RenardHooimaaijers.pdf>  
Van Rompuy, H. Speech at College of Europe 25 February 2010. ‘The challenges for Europe in a 
changing world’ Available at: 
 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/113067.pdf> 
 
Smith, K. ‘The European Union at the Human Rights Council: Speaking with one voice but having little 
influence’. Journal of European Public Policy, (2010). 17: 2, 224-241.  
Sixth EU-China summit press statement, Beijing, 20 October 2003.  
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Expenditure Database. Available at 
<http://milexdata.sipri.org/>. 
Strupczewski, J. ‘G20 sees two steps to tackling global imbalances: EU,’ International Business Times, 13 
February 2011. 
The Joint Statement adopted at the St. Petersburg Summit, May 2003 
<www.eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/roadmap_economic_en.pdf>. 
United Nations Bibliografic Information System unbisnet.un.org 
 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. Available at 
<http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm>. 
United Nations General Assembly website. Available at <http://www.un.org/en/ga/>. 
 
United Nations General Assembly list of resolutions. Available at 
<http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm>. 
 
United Nations Security Council list of resolution. Available at 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions11.htm>. 
 
Voeten, E. ‘Clashes in the Assembly’, International Organization, (2000). 
Vol. 54 (2), pp. 185-215. 
Wilson D. and Purushothaman, R. Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No: 99 Dreaming With BRICs: 
The Path to 2050. (2003). 
 
The EU Foreign Policy towards the BRICS and other Emerging powers: objectives and strategies 
 43
Wouters, J., S. Basu and S. Schunz ‘Meeting the Challenges of a Multilateralized World? The 
‘Multilaterability’ of the European Union’, LCGGS Working Paper 13 (Leuven Centre for Global 
Governance Studies). (2008). 
Yamakawa, T., A. Swarnali and A. Kelston ‘BRICs Lead the Global Recovery’, BRICs Monthly 09/05. (2009). 
 
Zhou Xiaochuan [⛷⺞ぬ] (2009). ␂ℝ㟈槸⦌棔徶ゐ⇢侊䤓㊬劒 [Reflections on reforming the 
international monetary system]. People’s Bank of China, March 24. Available at: 
<www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/hanglingdao/2950/2010/20100914193900497315048/20100914193900497
315048_.html>. 

